REPORT RESUMES

ED 003 464 24

AN INTEGRATED THEORY FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATION--PILOT DEVELOPMENT (THE CASE OF MOTIVATION).

BY- HANSEN, DONALD A. ZOLLSCHAN, GEORGE K.
PURDUE UNIV., LAFAYETTE, IND.

REPORT NUMBER CRP-S-148 PUB DATE 64
EDRS PRICE MF-$0.18 HC-$4.20 105P.

DESCRIPTORS- *BEHAVIOR THEORIES, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, *MOTIVATION, *SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, *SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, *OBJECTIVES, LAFAYETTE, INDIANA

A PARTIAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION WAS CONSTRUCTED WITH A FOCUS ON THE INDIVIDUAL-IN-SITUATION AND SOCIETAL PHENOMENA. THIS WAS AN INITIAL STEP TOWARD RESOLUTION OF LARGER PROBLEMS--(1) RESEARCH-ORIENTED THEORIES EMPLOYED BY PSYCHOLOGISTS AND SOCIOLOGISTS ARE OFTEN DIFFICULT TO INTERRELATE WITH ACTION-ORIENTED EDUCATIONAL THEORIES AND (2) SPECIAL METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND SOCIOLOGIST SEEM TO CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER WHEN APPLIED TO EDUCATIONAL SUBJECTS. THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVATION DEPICTED (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF GOALS FROM EXIGENCIES ACTING UPON EXPECTATIONS, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND AN EQUILIBRIUM OF TENSIONS, (2) ATTRACTION OF ACTIONS TO SEQUENTIALLY LINKED GOALS, AND (3) IMPACT OF HUMAN ACTORS AS STABLE OBJECTS WHICH AFFECT CHOICES OF GOALS. APPENDICES PRESENTED (1) SUGGESTIONS ON THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION FROM WHICH THE THEORY OF MOTIVATION WAS DERIVED AND (2) SPECULATIONS ON MOTIVATION AND THE CLASSROOM WHICH EXPLORED FALSIFICATIONS, AUTONOMY, AND ACHIEVEMENT. (JM)

ED003464

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
Office of Education
This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated do not necessarily represent official Office of Education position or policy.

AN INTEGRATED THEORY FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATION: PILOT DEVELOPMENT (THE CASE OF MOTIVATION)

Cooperative Research Project No. S-148

Donald A. Hansen and George K. Zollschan,
Purdue University
Lafayette, Indiana

July-August 1964

The research reported herein was supported by the Cooperative Research Program of the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

ED 003464

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction....................................Page 1

Limitations in Extant Theories of Motivation..Page 3

A Partial Theory of Motivation................Page 27

Concluding Remarks............................Page 50

Appendices

- A. Draft Propositional Calculus for the Theory of Institutionalization ....Page 53
- B. Some Speculations on Motivation and the Classroom: Controlled Falsification, Autonomy and Achievement.................Page 73
- C. Annoated Bibliography of Reports Relating Motivation and Social Variables...........Page 93

Illustrations:

- Figure: The Relation of Affect, Cognition and Evaluation....Page 48
- Table: Rank Order on Five Qualities of Family, Peer and Teacher Relationships of Child.............................Page 77

INTRODUCTION

It is grossly true that sociologists are only now awakening to the fascinations of education. Indeed, the persistent inattention of the mainstream of sociology to education is a most arresting peculiarity, for education is near the heart-center of sociological problems: it is one of the major social institutions in all but the most simple communities; it offers unusual opportunities for historical and comparative studies of the development of social values; it is crucial in understanding social differentiation, stratification and mobility; schools and schools systems in major cities offer complex organizations and bureaucracies more readily approached than in almost any other large-scale organization, and teaching offers an accessible, emerging profession which is increasingly important to the continued functioning of contemporary societies.

As sociologists more actively investigate these fields, educators will benefit, by applying the findings in their work and in their theories. Such unintended fruits of sociological efforts are not uncommon even today: the potentials of research on stratification and mobility, for instance, were quickly recognized by educators and so completely embraced it is now commonplace to speak of the school as a social system, to analyze school boards with bureaucracy models, and to consider "structures of competition" when achievement motivation is discussed.

It is also true, however, that the potentials of sociology for education are being realized only partially, and is likely that even greater proportions of sociological effort will, for education, be wasted unless crucial shortcomings in current theories of man and society are overcome. Among the most crucial today is the lack of a unified theory of personality in society--a lack fostered both by psychologists who ignore community and society and by sociologists who systematically forget that man is in reality their subject matter. At the nucleus of this major problem is another problem, almost as difficult, and pregnant with implications--the problem of human motivation. What makes men act the way they do? Why do they so act that communities form and disintegrate? Why do they act in such ways that they themselves become mature and responsible, or twisted and ineffectual? Why, indeed, do they act at all?

To questions concerning motivation, then, this investigation is addressed. The authors are concerned with far more than motivation, however; they are concerned with the relation of man to society, with the operations of society, with problems of socialization, social control and mastery over nature. They are concerned, that is, with problems not only important to social and psychological theories, but at the heart of the theories and practices of educators and others who are of the human arts.

This report, then, is presented as a step toward a systematic, integrated theory of human life in both its individual and societal forms.

LIMITATIONS IN EXTANT THEORIES OF MOTIVATION

The luxury of pretending that humans are "hollow men, filled with straw," or even with nothing, can be enjoyed only for limited purposes. Eliot used the image, but only fleetingly, as an incisive metaphor of the moral poverty of a generation; some research psychologists continue to find it useful in simplifying descriptive relations between stimuli and action.

To anyone interested in understanding or describing human behavior in society, however, the image is empty in more ways than one. It fails miserably as a model of man, representing him as less even than a robot, as an empty, but mobile stage for the interplay of stimulus and response.

Most psychologists today reject this "empty organism" approach, and suggest that in research man be considered not hollow, but filled with complex routings of afferent and efferent nerves, through which organismic connections are made between stimulus and response. Such mechanico-chemical models (which might be thus depicted in current wit: "Heard about the human doll? Wind it up, and it winds back down"), no matter how complex, and no matter how useful in the laboratory, misses many of the priceless essentials and non-essentials of human social life. It does, however, identify one of the most urgent questions in contemporary theories of human behavior: How does the connection take place between afferent impulse and efferent impulse, or, to use a mechanistic metaphor, how is the gap bridged between input and output?

This question can be asked on other than the neurological level; on the cognitive level it has led some investigators such as Tolman, Kohler and Snygg to consider the place meaning plays in human behavior. Yet even an answer to this important question would not render motivation theory adequate to a full study of either society or of individual behavior: cognitive theorties of behavior bridge the gap only half-way, for at a crucial point they accept, however unintentionally, the assumption that action automatically follows cognition. Is is one thing, however, to say a man recognizes action potentials of a situation, and even that he decides a certain action is called for; it is quite another thing to say that he then acts. To know is not necessarily to do; something else is required to complete the bridge over the gap between the input and the output.

Until the bridge is fully formed, we have little hope of succeeding in a search for an adequate theory of motivation, of identifying the nature of the relation of man to society, or indeed of establishing causal connections between social phenomena. But this gap is not the only critical problem facing motivation theory. For another thing, the sweep of individual human experience has yet to be confronted in any single theory. Allport imaginatively discussed this general deficiency by appealing to Ancient Hindu wisdom:

> "Most men, the Hindus say, have four central desires. To some extent, though only roughly, they correspond

> to the developmental stages of life. The first desire is for pleasure--a condition fully and extensively recognized in our Western theories of tension reduction, reinforcement, libido, and needs. The second desire is for success--likewise fully recognized and studied in our investigation of power, status, leadership, masculinity, and need-achievment. Now the third desire is to do one's duty and to discharge one's responsibilities. . . Here our Western work begins to fade out. Excepting for some pale investigations of parental punishment, in relation to the development of childhood conscience, we have little to offer on the "duty" motive... Finally, the Hindus tell us that in many people all of these three motives pall, and they then seek intensely for greater understanding--for a philosophical or religious meaning--that will liberate them from pleasure, success, and duty".*

These deficiencies are compounded when societal phenomena are considered. Indeed, even a superficial consideration of sociology would reveal basic questions far beyond the scope of current theories of motivation, such as:

---

* Gordon Allport, "The Open System in Personality Theory," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 61 (1960, No. 3), 304-305.

1. What is the relation of individual motivation and action to social order; how does the observable capacity of the individual for social participation develop? How does order develop among the collectivity?

2. What is the relation of individual motivation to social restraint? How does the observable capacity of the individual for collectivity-orientation, rather than the self-orientation, develop? How does social control develop among the collectivity?

3. What is the relation of individual motivation to institutionalization and cultural innovation? How does the observable capacity of the individual for innovation (or controlled innovation) develop? How do modifications of collective patterns of behavior and relationships occur?

In short, we are asking how knowledge, evaluation, and action relate in the individual in such a way that even self-trancendence and self-negation can result, and how this process in one person relates to those in others in such a way that the dynamic stability of a community results. And we are suggesting that, to answer these questions, the study of human motivation and behavior must be attempted at many levels of analyses: organismic, personal societal, cultural. We further suggest that ideally the analyses proceed *simultaneously*, for each of the levels is inexorably related to each of the others; each part represents a different focus on the same material: human behavior, at once individual and societal.

It must be emphasized that we do not suggest that current theories of motivation (at least not most of them) be discarded; they are important for systematic, controlled research. What we do suggest is that a theory or model be sought which is less inadequate to the sweep and richness of social experience, that current theories be placed within the context of this model, that research hypotheses, whatever their origin, be evaluated within this context, and that extant data be ordered within this context.

Search for such a model need not, and must not, proceed without guidelines. An *impressive amount of incisive theory and data* which have been developed in psychology and, to a lesser extent, in sociology over the years, are available to help us gain an understanding of the task which is faced. To move toward our goal, rather than offer a simple description of each of the major theories propounded today, we will discuss the varied responses they offer to basic questions, involving energy sources, mechanisms, goals and social contexts of action. Most of the major theories cope well with more than one of these questions, but none copes successfully with all.

What Makes Man Act: Energy Sources and Arousal.

Before we can even come to the question of why a man chooses one action rather than that of another, we must have at least some preliminary agreement about why he acts at all. Over the years, various concepts such as libido, instinct, drives and propensities have been proposed as sources of energy and, sometimes, of arousal (and sometimes even, of the determinants of goal selection). In general, each of these concepts emphasizes that the individual is goaded into activity by internal tensions, and, in many theories these tensions are essentially negative. The individual seeks to escape the discomfort, or is "driven" to release the demanding energy. In many theories, this "pain-escape" is coupled with an idea of organismsic equilibrium, modeled after Cannon's work: A certain level of discomfort or tension is accepted by the organism (a state of equilibrium), and any increase of tension over that level will lead to activity until equilibrium is reestablished. In this general description may be included such influential theories as those of Hull, Miller and Dollard, Murray, Mower, Skiiner and, in great part, Freud. In more recent years such ideas continue to be offered, but have lost some popularity, and Allport has suggested that even Cannon would disapprove of the application of homeostatic models to the study of human behavior:

> "To satisfy needs, to reduce tension, to maintain equilibrium, comprise, in most theories, the basic formula of personality dynamics. Some authorities, such as Stagner and Mowrer regard this formula as fitting in with Cannon's account of homeostasis. Man's intricate adjustive behavior is simply an extension of the principle

> involved in temperature regulation, balance of blood volume, sugar content, and the like, in the face of environmental change... I myself doubt that Cannon would approve the extension, for to him the value of homostatsis lay in its capactity to free man for what he called 'the priceless unessentials' of life. When biological equilibrium is attained the priceless unessentials take over and constitute the major part of of human activity."*

Even the perennial idea of organismic hedonism (the organism seeks to maximize pleasure and minimize pain), however, is done scant justice by "tension reduction" theories, for pleasure seeking cannot be equated with pain avoidance. The possibility that the organism might in some situations seek to continue and even increase certain tensions has been often suggested and during the past decade, Olds** has conducted experiments on rats suggesting that the brain has a "pleasure center", excitment of which man lead to efforts to repeat the tension-producing stimulus. Similarly, McClelland***, Hebb**** and others deny that the intensity and duration of action is directly related to the strength of a stimulus (as most of the above named theorists suggest). They argue that the extremely strong stimuli usually result in a withdrawal or retreating type of behavior, while a moderate or light stimulus may result in an approach type of behavior in which the individual seeks not to escape the stimuli, and thus diminish the tension, but to actually continue or increase both stimuli and tension.

---

*Allport, op cit, 302.

**James S. Olds, "Hypothalamic Substrates of Reward," Physiological Review 42 (1962), 554-604: James S. Olds, "Self-stimulation of the Brain," Science, 127 (1958) 315-324.

***David McClelland, John Atkinson, Russell Clark and Edgar Lowell, The Achievement Motive, N.Y.: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1953.

****D.O. Hebb, The Organization of Behavior, N.Y.: Wiley, 1949

Such approach-avoidance behavior is readily observable, but it is difficult to determine whether it is simply biological in nature, or if the higher processes of thought and socially developed emotions are essential, or determinate. Whatever the argument, the observation of approach-avoidance and its common relation to expectations cannot be ignored in an adequate theory of motivation. Our reasons for treating energy sources and arousal mechanisms in the same section must be clear by now; though they may focus on analytically distinct areas, in most extant theories they are treated as one, and in any which would be of use in social theory, it would be difficult to speak of energy without speaking of arousal. Indeed, in our theory (see next section) it will be obvious that we operate on the level of the individual (involving socially meaningful interarrangements of "stimuli" and "responses") rather than at the level of the biologic organism. With this perspective--which we feel is at this time necessary to social analysis--the distinction between organismic energy sources and related "stimuli" is best ignored.

This means, for one thing, that in considering stimuli and energy in humans, it is necessary to introduce cognitive constructs. Without doing extreme violence to the theories, we can for the moment operate with two simple concepts: expectation and perception. (Their common general definitions will suffice.) To the sociologist, these concepts will most readily suggest "cognitive dissonance" theories, which hold that the individual will attempt to reduce the dissonance, which is in some way uncomfortable. In Festinger's words:"I am proposing that dissonance, that is, the existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions, is a motivating factor in its own right...Cognition refers to any knowledge, opinions, or beliefs about one's environemnt, or self, or behavior. Cognitive dissonance can be seen as an antecedent condition which leads toward dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to activity orientated to hunger-reduction."* Brehm suggests that "even those motivations that are ordinarily considered to be physiologically based have an important cognitive component...In particular, hunger is not simply a function of deprivation, and other physiological determinants; it is also a function of how hungry one thinks he is."**

---

* Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Evanston: Row-Peterson, 1957.

** Jack W. Brehm, "Motivational Effects of Cognitive Dissonance," Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: 1962, Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1963, 55-56. See also Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance, N.Y.: Wiley, 1962. The stimulating work of Douglas Crown on cognitive dissonance, as yet unpublished, promises to more closely relate dissonance theories to social variables.

Suggestive as such theories are, and however valid, they lead to a number of difficult questions, such as: Why is dissonance uncomfortable (is it adequate to claim it is a "motivating factor in its own right")? Why is a similar discrepancy agonizing to one person, but hardly noticed by another? Is there any difference (say in potentials for action, or for reorganization of values) between "moral" discrepancies and "knowledge" discrepancies? Such questions alone do not invalidate a theory, however. For the moment, let us merely suggest that theories of cognitive dissonance are highly suggestive, though they are not, and they do not pretend to be, adequate to a full theory of human behavior.

With the concept of expectation a crucial move from simple biological determinism is made, and an important link with social materials is established. Besides the phenomenological theorists (who, excepting the Gestaltists, have made few contributions to the study of motivation), the emphasis on "expectation" is most closely associated with the names of Hebb and McClelland.

Hebb* argued that the stimulus pattern is crucial to the arousal of activity when there is a moderate discrepancy between expectation and perception. Generally approving of Hebb's argument, but criticizing its limitations of scope, McClelland presented an argument which some sociologists have recognized as pertinent to their theories, expecially as it is applied in part to problems of economic growth[*] at the core of McClelland's theories is the argument that goal-directed behavior is dependent upon affect. In proposing this theory over a decade ago, McClelland recognized he was putting himself up against "the whole weight of psychological tradition," which supported the opposite view, "namely that affect is the by-product or accompaniment of motives".[**]

---

*Op cit.

In addition to the weight of his arguments supporting his theory[***] sociologists familiar with McClelland's theory find it promising both because it emphasizes that all goal-directed behavior is in some sense acquired rather than innate, and because affect and expectation (see discussion under "learning") are most useful concepts in developing the constructs necessary for relating the social and individual perspectives on behavior. Among other deficiencies, however, the theory begs the question of neurological firings and neural involvements. In the long run this may be considered a drawback, but, important as the neural aspects of behavior are ultimately to theories of motivation, human behavior, and society, at this time they are best left to neurological investigators. We shall be satisfied for now, with a theory which only does not contradict established neurological data and theory.

---

[*] David McClelland, The Achieving Society, Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961.

[**] McClelland, Achievement Motive, op cit, 37.

[***] Op Cit, Cpt.2.

In the theory presented in the following section we have rejected conceptions of "empty organism", of simple neurological firings, and of simple patterns of "stimuli" as inadequate (however valid) to a theory of human behavior. We have suggested however, that these types of theories have led to establishment of much data with which an adequate theory must be consistent. In addition, an adequate theory must be able to cope with the phenomena suggested in concepts of cognitive dissonance and "approach-avoidance" behavior, as related to strength and duration of "stimuli".

We also find McClelland's argument for affect as precedent to action highly suggestive; for one thing, it allows the frustrating questions of "unconscious" determinants of behavior to be skirted. We do not claim, nor deny, that action may be "stimulated" and "directed" by cognitive and evaluative constructs not available to immediate perception (i.e. "unconscious"), and by "primitive" emotion (i.e. not subject to articulation in social terms). But we are suggesting that these underlying and unreportable influences can be meaningfully treated at this time only as they emerge into the perceivable and reportable phenomena of cognition and action.

Closely related to this stance, we also pay scant attention to the question of whether instincts or biological drives actually exist in man. With an emphasis on the precedence of affect, as McClelland has pointed out, the distinction between basic and secondary drives is not necessary. A drive, if we were to use the term, would refer to something like somatic or affective excitation which leads the individual to seek some desired object-relationship. In short, we follow Hebb's[*] insistence that activity is a condition of the organism; we should take it as "given," and concern ourselves as sociologists and psychologists, with arousal and direction of action.

2. What Determines Choice of Action: Mechanisms

We can now ask: Why does an individual choose one action rather than another? Four types of mechanisms must be approached if we are to move toward an answer: Mechanisms of arousal (treated in the preceding section), goal selection, learning, goal formation.

A. Learning. Since in the first section we endorsed McClelland's statement that all goal-oriented behavior is "learned", we must ask what, then, is learning? It is not sufficient to consider learning as the establishment of neural memory traces, for it is quite obvious that in the higher animals cognition and evaluation may also play parts. The study of learning, using concepts such as contiguity, reinforcement and insight has been widely criticized especially on the grounds that associative learning cannot account for manifestations of "intrinsic requiredness", or "propriate striving", or self-transcendece. This argument, however important, cannot be adequately discussed here; we leave open the possibility of treating such materials (via their expression in affect), but do not endorse them as essential to our theory. We are, however, very much concerned with the observable phenomena of martyrdom, efforts to attain Nirrana, and less dramatic attempts to achieve godliness, or to otherwise "transcend" what one is at the moment. An adequate theory of human motivations cannot ignore such behavior; our only hesitation is to claim that it does or does not, emerge from any inherent qualities, or from "raw" human nature.

---

[*] *Op cit.*

On the question of associative vs. "motivated" learning, McClelland is again stimulating: "Learning results from contiguity but it is especially influenced by the presence of a motivational association based on the past contiguity of cues and affective states"* In approaching the question of why problem solving or instrumental learning occurs more quickly "in the presence of the motivational association", McClelland states: 1) that the organism seeks to maximize pleasure and to minimize pain, 2) that responses which cue-off anticipated pleasure will be made preferentially, 3) that in a problem-solving situation some responses will tend to be more closely associated with pleasure, and 4) that these responses will tend to be repeated since they cue-off anticipated pleasure more dependably.** In short, contiguity theories are sufficient for learning, but learning is more probable when affect is involved.

---

*Op cit, 95.

**Op cit, 93.

In this explanation, which must seem reasonable to sociologists, McClelland is moving into the realm of "expectations." In considering the source of expectations, McClelland identifies the importance of past experience; indeed, this is crucial to his whole concept of "motive", which he defines as, "Certain stimuli or situations involving discrepancies between expectations (adaptation level) and perception or sources of primary, unlearned affect, neither positive nor negative in nature. Cues which are paired with these affective states, changes in these affective states, and the conditions producing them, become capable of redintegrating a state (a) derived from the original affective situation (a) but not identical with it."*

But even McClelland s statements are cumbersome and disappointing in societal prospective, in part because he treats learning only as "acquisition of responses".** The concepts cognition and expectation, however, offer links between such theories and those which would emphasize the individual's capacity to symbolically manipulate his environment, to successfully "invent" his own "associations", implying some degree of conscious control over the process (rather than mere responssive behavior). Once again, however, the influence of affect must be emphasized: those inventive experiences (or, experiences in thought) in which affect is involved will be more actively pursued, and more likely to be remembered, or learned.

---

*Op cit, 28.

** Op cit, 89.

In sharp contrast to McClelland and other psychologists, sociologists have been often accused of proposing cultural determinism, emphasizing social influences as supreme in the determination of an individual's learning and motivation. The accusation is not entirely unjust. Recognizing some deeply inherent potentials of human nature, some theories have suggested that these potentials are so extremely molded by social and cultural contexts that the raw organismic materials of human nature emerge quite unrecognizable, and social nature varies extremely from culture to culture. Hence, they claim, such ideas of immutable drives or unvarying instincts are demonstrably false; the plasticity of man is almost limitless.

Murphy, in briefly reviewing such theories, suggests that they fail to recognize the "rich potentialities for social living which are just as much a part of raw human nature as are the instincts of visceral origin", and out of which art, science, religion, etc., are derived. They also give too little attention, Murphy suggests, to the limitations in human nature, in feeling and thinking, which set limitations on the variations culture can impose. "The conception of social creativeness in the making of human nature is profound, but it cannot with impunity formulate a conception which denied the firm and enduring status in human nature of deep and undeniable cravings.* To this criticism must be added that the cultural determinist exagerates the differences of cultures, ignoring the simularities: indeed, cross-cultural comparisions can be read to suggest the relative *inplasticity* of man.

---

* Gardner Murphy, "Social Motivation", in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol II, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1954, 631.

With McClelland's insistence on the importance of affect in both learning and motivation, the possibility of forgetting the importance of human potentialities, capacities and limitations is minimized, for it cannot be denied that affect, however varied the social, cultural, and human environmental conditions which can arouse it, is basically an organismic quality. Through the exercise of affect, the potentials and capacities may impose limitations on the plasticity; through affect the "essential being", the well-springs of creativity, and other qualities possibly inherent in human nature may be expressed.

B. Goal formation. We have asked two questions: What is the energy source of human activity, and how does the individual learn to effectively direct his actions? We now ask why the individual acts in one "direction" rather than in another.

In many ways, Freud"s conceptions are highly suggestive and useful, in both social and psychological analyses. His conception of cathexis (affective investment) remains one of the most challenging in behavioral theory, and both sociologists and psychologists have used it as the basis of theories of goal formation. Indeed, it is the basis of the central sociological concept, introduced above, of "identification" in which the individual desires to "be like" some other individual. Tolman astutely suggested that the process of identification is most fundamental to the development of the self-ideal, a construct in which he combined Freudian concepts of "ego ideal" and "superego".[*] The self-ideal, then, involved a cathected image of what the individual would like to be like, based primarily on his perception of what was desirable and undesirable in other individuals. The similarity of these two sociological concepts of identification and of self judgement is evident, and in Mead's insistence that what is cathected is not another object, but a relationship, the importance of social sources of goal formation is seen. Goals, in this light, might be considered cathected relationships of the individual with other persons. Some of these relationships would be considered desirable, others undesirable (or, range in valence from extremely positive to extremely negative) but both types could be properly described as goals.

Such a conception exceeds what any behavioristic psychologist might offer, but even this fails to cope fully with the range of phenomena which a theory of human behavior must address. How, for instance, is transcendental striving accounted for with this approach? If relationships to other individuals are the only ones which can be cathected, how can the mystic be accounted for? How the rebellious fanatic? In the following theory, we attempt to offer a simple lead toward discription of such observable behavior.

---

[*] Edward Tolman, "A Psychological Model," in Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 311-ff.

C. Goal selection. Given that an individual has, through learning, formed a number of goals from which he can select a goal in any situation, the question becomes: What are the mechanisms involved in the actual selection of the goal in a specific situation? Sociological analyses often emphasize W. I. Thomas' useful concept of the "definition of the situation" and the concept of social roles (or role expectations), and phenomenological psychologists and cognitive psychologists use similar conceptions such as phenomenal representations and cognitive mapping. Each of these suggests that the phenomenological representation by the individual of self-in-situation. His choice of actions is considered situationally rational: given his views of himself and his situation, he chooses the goal or selects the map most likely to satisfy or least likely to upset.

The usefulness of these conceptions cannot be denied, yet precisely here is confronted the problem introduced earlier: How is the jump made from cognition (or definition of the situation, or phenomenal representation, or mapping) to the actual act? This problem has generally been ignored in both psychology and sociology, but one original and readable account suggests a concept of "plans" to help bridge the gap.* A plan is any hierarchical process in the organism that can control the order in which a sequence of operations is to be performed. A plan is, for the organism, essentially the same as a program for a computer, especially if the program has a sort of hierarchy or values. Further, a distinction may be made between intent and goal. "Intents" are "used to refer to the uncompleted parts of a plan whose execution has already begun". A motive, on the other hand (or, in our terms, a goal), "is comprised of two independent parts: value and intention".*

---

*G.A. Miller, E. Galanter and K.H. Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior, N.Y.: Holt, 1960.

It can be legitimately asked why have we, in considering goal selection, ignored the idea of "drives", and the considerable work done on classification of motives or goals? And why have we not mentioned the sociological concept of social function, and emphasized the influence of "functional requiredness" in determining goal formation and selection? We have ignored these purposefully, on the grounds that they can help us little in our effort. The lack of agreement from one list to another has often been noted and as have the differences between sociological and psychological lists, not only in items, but also in the types of items included.

More importantly, however, the listing of such goals does not offer explanations of behavior.** To common sense, any given behavior is made intelligible when the form "X does Y in order to..." ("X eats meat in order to survive") is completed. Indeed, it must be admitted that this does make sense of the individual's actions; but it does not explain why X does Y. Why does X not do Z (eat pills) in order to gain his ends? And, indeed, in choosing Y, does X intend to gain the ends so obvious to the observer?

---

*Ibid, 61.

**For discussion of this point, see B. F. Skinner, Science and Behavior, N.Y.: Macmillan, 1953, and Dalbir Bindra, Motivation: A Systematic Reinterpretation, N.Y.: Ronald, 1959.

Our point is that it is entirely defensible to seek objective sensibility in human actions, and even to describe the patterns and tendencies of human behavior. But it is not defensible to take these tendencies as explanation of behavior, nor as descriptions of the genesis of actions. It must be apparent that discussions of the "functions of behavior" which are so actively pursued in both psychology and in sociology today are of this type of description: They refer not to the causes of behavior but to certain consequences (or to consequences of the consequences) and hence are quite inadequate if we are seeking to understand or describe human and social behavior. They are useful only as sensitizers; they have no other place in a theory of motivation.

D. Of what importance are social contexts to motivation? It is suggested above, and argued eloquently by others, that extreme cultural determinism is no more defensible than extreme organic determinism of either action or personality formation. Yet it cannot be denied that much if not most human behavior takes place with reference to social situations, and that other individuals provide one of the basic sources of goal objects and inspiration to the individual.

Sociologists and psychologists have established a number of concepts of extreme importance relating the individual to his environment. Beyond the arousal mechanisms suggested in the first section (which could as legitimately be discussed in this section) are concepts such as reference groups, significant others, generalized other, values, norms, language codes, roles and expectations. Sociologists also offer an array of structural concepts --implying that reference groups, values, expectations, etc., will vary somewhat uniformly from (for example) social class to social class, from one authority type to another, from one organizational type to another. It can be argued that these concepts, which have to do with social and cultural contexts and influences on behavior, refer to crucial influences in every aspect of motivation, including energy sources: Although energy sources must be considered primarily a function of the organism, it is highly likely that their operation is culturally and socially influenced, as Parsons has suggested in his idea of the "language of the emotions."

It should be remembered, however, that even a theory of "interpenetrating" organism, cultural and social contexts may be inadequate in explaining the etiology of all social behavior. Once again, we suggest the phenomena of apparent self-actualization, involving actions which may appear to deny any social-cultural relation. But even such actions may be organized in socially relevant ways (consider Abraham's intended slaying of his son, or the various modes of self-integrity in various societies) and must be called social behavior. For most normative analysis of society and of individual, such "deviant cases" are of little note; but for an understanding of the full range of human behavior, they are of special importance. A theory is needed, then, which has the capacity of looking not only at social relationships, but also at the relationship of the individual actor to non-social materials in his environment and to the products of his own imagination.

In the following theory of motivation, we shall use many of the familiar sociological constructs, consistent with the actional frame of reference associated with Max Weber; there is little need to reiterate them here. (See appendix A for a preliminary statement the general theory of which the following theory may be considered the nucleus.) In this theory, we have attempted to construct a framework adequate to meet the problems we have suggested face extant theories of motivation. Although time has not permitted us to specifically identify our solutions to these problems, we have consistently kept in mind that:

*A few theories contradict established "facts." This number is small, however, if for no other reason than that the facts are also few.

*In some work, action consequences (lists of culturally approved goals) are mistaken for sources of action.

*A distinction between behavior (automatic or imposed response) and action (involving choice) is rarely drawn; such a distinction is crucial to social analyses.

*The gap between knowledge, evaluation and action is generally ignored.

*The gap between societal and individual perspectives on behavior is unbridged; more specifically, the relation between knowledge, evaluation and action in one actor and that in another is ignored.

*Most theories do not address the range of human experience suggested by diverse concepts such as response, becoming, being and search for understanding.

No theory, then, has yet succeeded in coping with the full range of phenomena which have been demonstrated crucial in human and social behavior. The effort in the following section is to present an initial and partial statement of a system that is less inadequate to the richness and depth of human behavior.

A PARTIAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION

In a series of previous papers Zollschan has sketched some of the outlines of a theory of social change, concentrating upon the formation of stable and recurrent patterns of interpersonal action, their maintenance, and their dissolution.* In developing this body of theory it was found necessary to construct what, in effect, amounts to a nascent theory of motivation specifically appropriate for the purposes of sociological explanation. Although such an orientation constitutes the unintended by-product of the broader theoretical framework, it does reflect a feeling of unease among sociologists with existing bodies of motivation theory in the field of psychology. Such discomfort has ample justification when one considers the central position that an adequately developed and sociologically appropriate theory of motivation would hold in the field of sociology providing it were available.

To illustrate this contention one need only refer to Louis Schneider's distinction of motivational and synergic levels of analysis in sociology. According to Schneider, the motivational level refers to what he calls normative prescriptions of behavior, while "...the latter refers to the conjoint effects of motivated action, looked at from the point of view of an observer not directly interested in motivation nor in its effects or results for an _individual_, but rather in its effects or results for the social system".[*] According to the above distinction of the kinds of interests pursued by sociologists, motivation, either directly or through its indirect conjoint consequences, would appear to be quite central to sociological concerns--and Schneider's distinction is by no means unique in this stress.

---

*See, especially section 2 in George K. Zollaschan and Walter Hirsch, Exploration in Social Change, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964.

If we turn from discussions of sociological analysis to instances of such analysis in themselves, however, we find that the assumptions about motivation that are actually employed tend to be rough, implicit, and _ad hoc_, rather than explicitly, consistently, and formally developed. One might almost say that the situation parrallells the use of assumptions concerning human motives and behavior by the traditional historian--untouched by actual considerations of possible scientific principles governing the behavior of actors playing out their roles upon the stage of history. This, however, is not to attach sole blame on the sociologist. If his assumptions concerning motivation have been no better than rules of thumb, lodged in the interstices of his analysis, then the fault lies partly at the door of the psychologist (ostensibly, the specialist on matters of motivation), who has failed to supply the former with a set of formulations suitable for his particular analytic task. The accepted imagery of the motivation theorist, revolving as it does around conceptions of raw physical stimuli having the potential of hitting the sensory receptorium of an organism, and eliciting specifyable behavioral responses from the organism, is a thousand miles removed from the arena of social action containing the drama which it is the sociologist's task to explain.

---

[*] Louis Schneider, "Some Psychiatric Views on 'Freedom' and the Theory of Social Systems," _Psychiatry_, 12 (August 1949), 260.

The social actor, as distinct from any randomly given living organism, is an enormously selective sieve of raw stimuli occuring in his environment. More often than not, he transforms such stimuli into symbolic representations before taking some kind of action. What is more, the social actor lives in an elaborate secondary environment itself largely constituted out of symbols--his culture--which themselves assume the effective characteristics of organismic stimuli. If we may adopt Rapaport's distinction between Freudian primary process and secondary process thought and behavior for our purposes, the relationship between the social actor and the biological organism as regards the transmutation of stimuli into behavior is like that between information engineering and power engineering respectively. Following this metaphor, we may say that the psychologist has been concerned with the problem of motivation as one in the area of power engineering, whereas the sociologist requires motivational models appropriate for problems of information engineering. The danger of pursuing such metaphors is well-known, and instead of continuing with its elaboration we may usefully turn to the discussion of Zollschan's attempt to supply a set of images and concepts of motivation doing justice to the social actor pursuing his symbolically expressible intentions in a socio-cultural setting.

It has already been implied that *social action*, as distinct from *organismic behavior* is considered by us to be the major process with which sociological and cultural studies (and, for that matter, studies of the human personality) are concerned. We view action as any motion which propells the actor from a given *status quo* to a specifiable goal. Where no activity to change the *status quo* (or "actively" to maintain it) occurs, we speak of *inertia*. For purposes of analysis, inertia is considered to be the initial state of any actor prior to the emission of action. Clearly, the term "inertia" had different meanings according to the level of organization of the system to which it refers. Rapaport's illuminating essay on the structure of psychoanalytic theory speaks of two such meanings. In primary process behavior the organism seeks to be free of all excitation, and behavior subserves this objective. Where such behavior fails to achieve gratification (i.e. the elimination of excitation) the delay in gratification, as it were, becomes "structuralized"--it gives rise to the personality with its mechanisms of defence and established routes for the detour of immediately gratifying behavior. Complete terminal discharge of tension in gratification gives way to discharge compatible with the maintenance of tension--"satisfaction" as distinct from gratification--and the tensions become bound in the structure itself.[*]

---

[*] David Rapaport, "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt," in Sigmund Koch, ed, *Psychology: A Study of a Science* Vol 3, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

Our view of motivation is, generally speaking, based upon Freud's.[*] However, besides elaborating the Freudian view, it takes some steps beyond the conception of inertia (or "equilibrium of tensions") implicit in the Freudian conception of secondary process thought and behavior. For one thing, the concept of "raw stimulus", which Freud shares with virtually all recent motivation theorists is abandonned. Not that the existence of raw stimuli "out there"need necessarily be denied, but besides behavior at a reflex level such as startle reactions to loud noises (on part of those, at least, who are not deaf!), such stimuli are connected to behavioral outcomes by extremely tennuous routes at the level of social action. Instead of speaking of stimuli as automatically touching off behavior in the human organism, we prefer to speak of a process whereby goals are established for a social actor toward which his action becomes directed. The process is initiated by what we call exigencies--provisionally to be defined as any conditions deviating from or disturbing the equilibrium of the actor (i.e. disturbances of inertia). But exigencies, while they may lead directly to merely organic behavior on part of the person (as in the startle reaction), do not give rise to social action directly. First the exigency must be articulated by the actor as a need. Needs have associated goals (to do with mitigation or removal of the need), and it is towards goals that action is directed. Thus we would maintain that, in action taking place in the socio-cultural realm (on the level of "meaning" as Max Weber puts it) an exigency--the special kind of stimulus that creates conditions of equilibrium for the actor--must first become transmuted into a need with associated goals before meaningful action can occur. The actor's system of behavior, in our view, is related to three structures of the personality: an equilibrium of tensions or excitations, activating behavior devoted to the diminution and overall balance of tensions; a horizon of justifications; and a horizon of expectations, each of the latter two being characterized by a strain toward consistency. A disturbance of any one of these structures would have the potential of leading to action, and may thus be viewed as an exigency. Taken in isolation, any disturbance of the equilibrium of excitations may be termed an affective discrepancy; any disturbance of the horizon of justification, an evaluative discrepancy; and any disturbance of the horizon of expectations, a cognitive discrepancy. A given exigency may be composed of any one of these discrepancies in pure form, or compounded of any combination of them.

---

[*] For a more detailed account of the relationship of our formulations to Freudian motivation theory, see George K. Zollschan, "Beyong the 'Reality Principle'", in Zollschan and Hirsch, op. cit., 175-200.

In view of the distinction we have made between exigencies on the one hand, and needs with their associated goals on the other, the process of articulation--the transmutation of exigencies into needs--becomes a crucial consideration in a motivation theory adequate for the explanation of social action. It is need as we use the term here that supplies the motive for specifically social (i.e.

"meaningful") action. This is not meant to imply that behavior in direct response to an exigency (such as reflex behavior) is to be viewed as "non-motivated"; simply that the kind of motivation that occurs on the organismic level of analysis is different from motivation mediated by the process of articulation. Non-motivated behavior, in other words, is a contradiction in terms in our conception--much as the idea of motion without"force" would have been a contradiction in terms within the set of assumptions of early classical mechanics. But the behavior of any given human person (*feral man* may be excluded for purposes of our argument--we are speaking of a person who participates or has at any time participated as a member of society) can, we maintain, be explained only by reference to at least two analytically distinct levels of motivation--the organismic and the socio-cultural. We have no objection to calling the organismic level motive a "stimulus" (although, even here, the question of what actually constitutes a stimulus for a given organism is by no means settled) but on the socio-cultural level of explanation it is the articulated need--"processed" as it were, by the personality--rather than the exigency evoking the articulation of the need which supplies the motive for action. Thus it is quite possible in our view for an actor to engage in false articulation--that is, to articulate a need which (from the point of view of some all-knowing observer) does not reflect the exigency evoking its articulation--and still it will be the goals associated with this falsely articulated need toward which action will be directed and not the exigency *per se*.

It must be stressed that articulation in our view need not be a conscious process within the actor. Whenever behavior cannot be adequately explained without imputing a goal to the actor, we may assert that articulation has taken place. Quite conceivably much non-human behavior (particularly behavior of the kind to which some term such as "insight" has been attached) could also be illuminated by such a methodological procedure, but we are content to leave this question to be decided by qualified scholars in the relevant fields. As far as human action is concerned, certainly the motives imputed to actors by psychoanalysts and their various sympathizers in the field of Psychiatry, even though unconscious to the actors in question, correspond to what we have called needs and goals.

In order to be articulated as a need, an exigency must be salient, specifiable, and justifiable (or, at least, not "counter-justified"). That is to say, we may speak crudely of salience, specifiability, and justifiability as pre-requisites for the articulation of a given need--although we conceive of these terms rather as co-ordinates. Salience is a measure of the disturbance of the equilibrium of excitations, justifiability and specifiability are functions of the respective horizons of the actor. To speak of these measures as co-ordinates implies that, for example, in a situation of neutral justifiability, even an exigency of relatively high salience may not be articulated as a need provided that specifiability is lacking (i.e. there are no cognitive resources available to the actor in terms of which the elements involved in what would emerge as the need could be identified and categorized). If follows from this particular example of the co-ordinate character of salience, specifiabity, and justifiability, that an exigency of very high salience in cases where the actor lacks the means of specification and / or justification may give rise to purely organismic responses rather than to social action. In cases where a need comes to be articulated it becomes associated with goals intended to mitigate or remove it. It is precisely action toward such goals that constitutes the kind of behavior interesting to the student of socio-cultural systems.

Leaving aside for the moment issues associated with the choice of goals where a need can give rise to alternative ones, we may turn to the question of locomotion toward goals. One can conceive of instances where a need can be removed by a simple act. Such instances are but one stem removed from S-R models of behavior, and different from such models only in that the action is not directly touched off by the exigency but mediated by articulation. Such a single need-alleviating act we may call a goal-jump. Other needs (most of the sociologically interesting ones) cannot be extinguished by such short-lived activity; they require prolongued and complex activity in the direction of the goal. Such prolongued activity in the direction of a goal has been called a *pathway*,[*] and Miller, Gallanter and Pribram[**] mean something very similar when they speak of a *plan*. A certain activity will continue along the same pathway either when the need is an enduring one (i.e. there is a constant bombardment by the exigecy), or if the pathway leads to unanticipated goals other than the originating one. A given pathway, in effect, can come to be the road leading to many and varied goals.

Even in the initial case, where a given pathway is conceived of as leading to one final goal, we can subdivide it in terms of "stopping places" or stations. Thus if a man's goal is to publish a book on some subject, the first station might consist of obtaining a publishing contract, a subsequent station to complete the manuscript, yet another one to get the proofs and index out of the way. These stations can be conceived of as goals in their own right though, to be sure, for the man wanting to publish the book they would not be stations at which an indefinate stop would be welcomed. But when the book is finally published the pathway may well extend beyond this goal and lead to activities dedicated to promoting and selling the already published book. Thus we appear to have a chain of goals along the pathway, to which the original goal of coming out in publication constitutes only one link. For a person on a pathway the "goal" toward which he is acting may thus appear to be the next stopping place, or a station further along the line, or, perhaps, just to keep going along the route.

---

[*] Zollschan and Hirsch, *op cit*, 191-192, also 169.

[**] *Op cit.*

There is another (though closely related) sense in which a pathway may be seen as leading to more than one goal. Once a given pathway is established it may be used by the actor as a route along which action passes in order to achieve additional goals. A new exigency will tend, where possible, to be articulated in terms of needs which can be satisfied along the pathways that are already in existence for the actor. This fact gives rise to Freudian observations concerning the "overdetermination" of action; we may enunciate it as the principle of conservation of action.

Having arrived at a conservation principle in our discussion of motivation, it is time to digress for a few pages and to discuss the concept of energy as it applies to our problem. We do not believe that motivational energy can be equated in any direct or simple manner with bio-chemical energy. Although, admittedly, the physical movements of actors in pursuit of goals burn calories in the organisms to which the actors, so to speak, are "attached," no clear relationship between the expenditure of calories and "amount of motivation" has been specified. We doubt whether such a specification is possible in principle. A number of primitive terms that we have introduced, however, have something like an analogical relationship to the term "energy" as employed in physics. Salience--the measure of disequilibration of excitations --is one of them, and other possible sources are the "strains toward consistency" that we have postulated for the horizons of expectations and justifications. Zollschan[*] has previously argued that these strains are independent energy sources of motivation in their own right; that, in other words, purely cognitive or evaluative discrepancies may derive their salience from these strains rather than from the equilibrium of excitations. To give a concrete example: if (under somewhat improbable ceteris paribus assumptions) the sun were to rise in the west one morning, thereby falsifying a person's expectations, he might experience this falsification as a highly salient exigency without otherwise being in the least discomfitted by the event.

A reply to such an argument might be that any person who would experience this purely cognitive discrepancy as highly salient would somehow relate such a falsification of a basic expectation to an injury of his conception of himself in his world. That, in other words, a cognitive discrepancy can only become a salient exigency for a person if the dissapointed expectations borrow their energy from the equilibrium of excitations by cathexis (to be discussed below). Without prejudging this philosophical issue (and no one would deny that professional astronomers--deriving their prestige, inter alia, from the accuracy of their predictions of solar motion--would be more likely to be upset by our hypothetical cosmic event than the ordinary man in the street!) we shall procede on the assumption that there is a single source of motivational energy; namely the equilibrium of excitations. Such, certainly, is Freud's own view. This leads us directly to the discussion of cathexis.

---

[*] "Beyond...". Op cit, 193-195.

For purposes of our present argument, we assume that the earliest phenomenological world of human actors tends to reflect their equilibrium of excitations, at least inasfar as this finds stable representations of gratification and frustration to which symbols become attached. From the point of view of cognition, we may say, pathways are directed to their goals or "objectives" through a realm of objects. This object realm constitutes the infant actor's representation of his cognitive world or his phenomenology; in other word, the earliest form of his horizon of expectations. Additionally, we may assume, objects seen as blocking a pathway to a goal become conceived of as "bad objects", while these lining a pathway toward gratification or whose attainment is seen in itself as the nature of the gratification become "good objects". Objects which are represented either as good or as bad (as well as actions related to the production or destruction of such objects) form the basis of the actor's horizon of justifications. We are suggesting that such evaluatively tinged objects become repositories of affect--that they have the effect, as it were, of "objectifying" the actor's equilibrium of excitations (or, more strictly, that part of it which has become subject to the disciplines of secondary process thought and action) in his phenomenological representation of the world. The attachment of affect to these objects we may call cathexis--the detachment of affect from any of these objects may be termed decathexis. To be sure, certain objects which facilitate one pathway may block another, and toward these the actor develops "ambivalent" affect, combining positive and negative cathexis (i.e. representing the object as both "good" and "bad"). There may be yet others which are cathectically and evaluatively neutral from the beginning, but we incline to the view that in the formation of the actor's earliest representation of objects cathexis, evaluation, and cognition tend to be fused. The separation of cathectically and evaluatively neutral representations of objects, and of cathectically neutral evaluations of objects and actions, we believe, occurs later and takes the form of decathexis. Such a model of human phenomenology leaves us with many empirical puzzles: To what extent (if at all) does the distribution of quanta of affect to objects at any given point in time accurately reflect such objects' contribution to the maintenance of the equilibrium of excitations? What is the degree of stability and durability of the affect attaching to objects? Under what curcumstances do affectively neutral objects become represented de novo? Under what circumstances does decathexis of cognitive and evaluative elements occur? Puzzles there are, but it is the virtue of our model that it brings them into the open clearly and sharply and thereby renders them appropriate to attempted research manipulation.

Prior to developing the model we have presented, and delineating the processes of separation of the horizons of expectations and justifications from their common phenomenological matrix, a few words regarding our use of the term "object" would appear to be necessary. To this point we have used it very generally to refer to any "thing" whatsoever capable of becoming a representation for the actor, being evaluated by him, and having affect attached to it. This usage would not appear to be too far removed from that of the Freudians, though the latter have a tendency to reserve it (albeit unsystematically) for persons within the cognitive field of the actor, including the actor's representations of "self". We systematically extend the definition of the term to include any inanimate objects, groups, and symbols. A particularly important variety of object within our extended meaning of the term, however, is comprised of learned skills which enable more rapid and accurate travel along pathways to goals; such skills, typically passed on to actors through interpersonal channels, we may call cultural vehicles. Although they consist of little else than particular systematic sequences of action, it is undeniable that they become representationally objectified both in phenomenology and common linguistic usage. Language itself provides a major example of what we mean by a vehicle, though non-linguistic symbol systems, technologies, and formalized legitimations also fall within this general class. We may add tools and instruments (i.e. constructed artifacts for the promotion of travel along a pathway to a goal) to this list, though such objects, once constructed, correspond to a more conventional conception of "things". The actor's attachment to his language (or the workman's to his tools), we suggest, is as much cathectic in character as is a man's to his wife. The objectification of those vehicles that consist of "skills" (i.e. action patterns) rather than of "things" is not difficult to explain. Such skills, at least initially, present themsleves to the actor as external objects to be mastered and, as it were, "incorporated". To be able to say "I want milk" under most circumstances has clear and considerable technical advantages over the mere emission of a howl (the latter, after all, is capable of various interpretation by the all-powerful dispenser of milk), yet the liguistic expression is a skill that must be acquired by learning and of whose lack the young actor may be painfully aware.

A particularly significant aspect of cathexis from the point of view of motivation theory is that cathected objects have the property of being antennae for the receipt of exigencies. If food objects are threatened, the threat becomes equivalent to a disequilibrating excitation (in proportion, we would hypothesize, to the quantum of affect attached to the particular threatened object in question).

By extending positive cathexes to objects the actor, as it were, "spreads a net" for the receipt of exigencies. This insight, certainly, is not foreign to anyone who has avoided "emotional involvements" at any time in order to save himself distress. Another way of putting this is to say that positively cathected objects have the characteristic of being quasi-goals--if a threat to such objects is articulated by the actor, he will act to protect them. If they are destroyed (or removed from the actor's sphere of operation) the actor may even enshrine them by incorporating their representation or some derivative of it into tis representation of self.* The actor's awareness of cathexis, indeed, often depends precisely upon the object's undergoing threat.

The analysis of negatively cathexed-"bad"-objects is somewhat more intricate and leads us to considerations of a level of tension in the equilibrium of excitations. It is possible, of course, to postulate that negatively cathected objects also are latent goals; their destruction being a cause of satisfaction to the actor (in cases, at least, where ambivalence does not complicate the situation). This is the aggressive component of what Freud called the "death instincts" (along with the underlying tendency toward inertia) and, like Freud, we could let the analysis rest at this point. We believe, however, that more illumination can be shed upon the problem if we return to our description of the origin of bad objects in the phenomenology of the actor. These, it will be remembered, are objects that, at some time in the history of the actor (and particularly at the time when the object first became represented to the actor) blocked the pathway to some goal or anticipated satisfaction. We have mentioned above the transition from a state in which the organism seeks to be free of all excitation to the establishment of an equilibrium of excitations involving the maintenance of a level of tension. Bad objects (and the amount of affect attaching to them) specifically objectify the level of tension in the equilibrium of excitations. Inasfar as they constitute an accurate mirror of this level of tension at a given time, their destruction corresponds to a lowering of the level of tension (accompanied, presumably, by the opening of previously blocked pathways).* If, however, a bad object does not represent a truly articulated and contemporaneously operative blockage in a pathway, satisfaction at the destruction of the bad object may be experienced by the actor without the level of tension in his equilibrium of excitations being diminished. It is, of course, this kind of instance that furnishes material for descriptions of "aggressive instincts" and the like. But the crucially distinctive element in such aggressive action stems from the fact that the bad object is not an eikonic or "true" objectification of the level of tension, or the "real" obstacle in the way of satisfaction along a pathway it ostensibly blocks. None the less, a bad object is an objectification even if it is a false one, and some satisfaction may be derived from its destruction. Thus, to give an example: If I represent my department chairman as a bad object standing in the way of my promotion (this being assumed to be my goal), the professional or even physical destruction of the chairman becomes a latent (or perhaps not so latent) goal in its own right--even in the absence of any necessary subjective connotation along the lines--"if I destroy him, I shall be promoted".

---

* For a superlatively brilliant, if somewhat loosely argued, analysis of this kind of phenomenon see Sigmund Freud, *Mourning and Melancholia*, in *Complete Works*, *Vol 4*. London: Hogarth Press, 1957.

---

*Our consideration of any given level of tension in the equilibrium of excitations as involving a frozen reservoir of exigencies which may become unfrozen as pathways to goals open up, may throw some light on McClelland's findings regarding stimuli which elicit what he calls "approach behavior". Not every experience which leads to action need be an exigency for the actor. Some experiences may, instead, open previously blocked pathways of action and thus help to effect a lowering of the tension level. For that matter, a person who "jumps for joy" acts in this manner, in our view, solely in relation to the unblocking of a pathway toward a valent goal.

We have spoken of cathected objects as extensions into the actor's phenomenological world of his equilibrium of excitations. But the establishment of objectification of affect in a highly evaluatively tinged cognitive world leads to more than just an extension of the equilibrium of excitations. The fact that objects are not simply repositories of affect but also items of cognition and evaluation means that not only excitations but evaluative discrepancies and cognitive falsifications begin to bombard the actor as soon as the first representations of objects are formed. The constant modification, particularly of cognitive representations and expectations that such an experiential bombardment elicits, we would suggest, has the effect of loosening new and constantly changing representations of objects from cathectic investment. As the phenomenological world of the actor becomes well stocked with highly variegated cognitions it becomes possible for the actor to construct object representations relatively free of affective loading, and even some evaluations (particularly those which are cognitively represented) become relatively affect-free.

Evaluative discrepancies and cognitive falsifications have results besides the decathexis of particular objects and the extablishment of increasingly mobile cathexes which can be attached to or withdrawn from objects. A primary additional effect, from our point of view, is the loosening of cognitions and evaluations from particular objects, giving rise to generalized expectations and evaluations. Such generalized expectations and justifications can become utilized for the articulation of novel needs and the breaking of new pathways. It should be stressed at this point that the particularity or generality of expectations and justifications is largely independent of their degree of cathectic investment.

In speaking of affect-free cognitions and evaluations we would be chary of positing a passionless realm of cognitive reason, uncontaminated by vulgar excitations, as the end product of the progressive decathexis of objects. Neither can we readily conceive of actions motivated solely by some disembodied _amor dei intellectualis_ and performed entirely _sine ira ac studio_. Such idealistic conceptions arise in protest against equally extreme views according to which any kind of disinterested cognition cannot occur. While the latter view (if it claims to describe the behavior of adult human actors) represents a sort of philosophical infantilism, the former is a variety of angelology which we are equally unable to accept. The separation of cognitions and evaluations from their direct association with sensory excitation can never be complete, and an area of overlap, populated by cathected objects, is maintained through the life of the actor. Indeed, any focused thought or organized systematic action requires, at least, the investment of a certain amount of what the Freudians call "attention cathexis" which involves bringing the objects or expectations in question at least momentarily to the periphery of the equilibrium of excitations. This is simply another way of saying that salience is a prerequisite of all articulation and action. What loosening from cathectic investment means is that a store or fund of expectations become available to the actor which are not tied to any particular affective coloration for lengthy periods of time. We emerge, in effect, with a model in which the horizons of expectations and justifications and the equilibrium of excitations overlap. The area of overlap constitutes the phenomenology of the actor at any given moment, and may be highly fluid over time. At any point of time, the model might be diagramatically represented as three overlapping circles, the horizon of expectations, the horizon of justifications, (divided by a dotted line dividing positive justifications and counter-justivications), and the equilibrium of excitations. Areas of pure excitation and potential cognition may exist at the given moment but we cannot conceive of justifications which are not either cognitively representable or embedded as preference and avoidance in the equilibrium of excitations. Consequently the circle describing the horizon of justifications overlaps entirely with the other two circles. The diagram may be presented as follows:



The Relation of Affect,
Cognition and Evaluation

The areas of various sectors depicted in the diagram is not meant to connote their relative importance or scope in any sense. It is to be merely regarded as an outcome of our artistic efforts.

Sectors labelled A and B are, respectively, composed of pure cognitives and excitations (tensions). Sector C includes those attention cathexes which are not evaluatively tinged. D and E are the realms of more or less generalized "good" and "bad" objects respectively. F and G are the residues of environmental obtrusions and intrusions into the infantile organism prior to the formation of secondary process thought and action. Some of these may later have reached cognitive objectification and would be in areas D and E. H and I are affectively neutral principles of evaluation operating within the cognitive realm. Such principles include what Max Weber had in mind when he spoke of "value orientations" (*Wertbeziehungen*)or principles whereby cognitive problems are articulated and cognitive pathways selected. They also correspond to Miller, Gallanter, and Prihram's *meta-plans*. Again, some of these principles might be affectively charged and would belong in sectors D and E.

An additional word should be said concerning justifications. Although, quite clearly, the attachment of evaluations to objects by the actor is affected by the evaluations of others--and particularly members of the actor's immediate family in the earliest years of life--such evaluations must always be regarded as part of the actor's own horizon of justifications. Thus an actor may be aware of the moral and aesthetic judgements of others, and these judgements may affect his actions. But their effect on the actor's actions comes from his horizon of expectations, except inasfar as the judgements in question are held by him in common with the others whose evaluations he rightly or falsely perceives. Under specifiable circumstances, the internalization of others' judgements does occur--we have implied as much in our reference to the actor's immediate family in childhood. The delineation of such processes of evaluative incorporation, however, falls beyond the purview of this report.

We arrive, then, at a kind of gravitational conception of motivation in which goals attract action along pathways. We have discussed the processes whereby such goals are established out of exigencies acting upon a field composed of overlapping horizons of expectations and justifiacations and an equilibrium of tensions. What is more, actors, depending upon the culture in which they operate and the idiosyncracies of their own peculiar historical life paths, form more or less stable objects which affect the choices of goals and of pathways to such goals and which have the potential of themselves taking on the character of goals.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have made, however painfully, a first step toward a socially adequate theory of motivation and human behavior. The construct stands far from complete, but it stands poised to cope with concepts ranging from "reflex" to "ideal self" and "self-actualization". That many of these conceps have not been explicitly treated is a reflection only of time limitations imposed in a two-month project. Time also does not allow us to completely identify the relevance of our theory to existing propositions and questions in motivation theory or to identify its centrality to societal phenomena. As for the latter, Appendix A suggests the societal relevance of the theory (which, in total, has been termed a theory of institutionalization), and Appendix B speculates on the pertinence of the theory to specific educational problems. We can only hint at the capacity of our construct to meet the limitations in extant motivational theories, suggesting, for instance, that the crucial gap between input and output has been bridged (if only with a rope bridge) by our focus on individual-in-situation, and by the concepts of "goals" and "pathways". S-R theories are handled easily with the developing construct, but no more easily than phenomenological: Along with specialized theories such as cognitive dissonance and the theories of McClelland, they are in broad form subsumed in our constmuct, indeed, are subsumed in such a way that the essential contributions of each are seen to be consistent with the contributions of the others.

However regretable the shortcomings in this report, we can but suggest that when time limits demand a choice, with few exceptions further construction must take precedence over clarification. For the moment we are entangled in the messy business of creation; the cleasing must wait.

APPENDICES

Appendices A and B represent efforts to move beyond the subject area addressed systematically and critically in the report; they should be taken as speculative and suggestive, rather than substantiated and definitive. As the appendices were developed independently by members of the research team it is important that the non-participants be absolved of guilt: George K. Zollschan is responsible for appendix A and D.A. Hansen for appendix B. Michael Malec compiled the bibliography.

APPENDIX A: DRAFT PROPOSITIONAL CALCULUS FOR THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION*

The following document constitutes an attempt to provide a general formalization of the Theory of Institutionalization from which our foregoing outline for a theory of motivation is derived. It will be abundantly clear that various parts of the general theory are at different levels of development, and the propositions are uneven in different sections of this draft. None the less, it appears to us to be worthwhile to present the theoretical and speculative substratum out of which our considerations on motivation have grown. The document includes the following sections:

A. A group of general propositions setting forth basic assumptions and orientations of the Institutionalization frame of reference as compared with other orientations.

B. A sharpening of Freudian propositions concerning primary and secondary process and their extension to organismic behavior in general.

C. This section tries to bridge the gap between meaningful action and organismic behavior, and gives a rationale for the basic structures of action in any actor.

D. This is the central section of the whole appendix, outlining the basic theoretical definitions concerning articulation and action--the two central categories of the theoretical framework.

E. The development of personality viewed as patterns and pathways of action persisting over time is presented in this section.

F. The development of inter-personal action (micro-sociology) is presented here.

G. This section is concerned with cultural dynamics and macro-sociology. Here there is a shift away from the focus on the individual actor maintained up to this point. Instead, concern is with the dynamics of systems independent of any given actors, like culture, ecology, and economics. These are interpreted as systems determining the situations in which actors are placed.

H. Alienation, viewed as a condition occuring where goals cannot be reached, is examined in this section. A tentative theory of psychopathology is proposed.

---

*By George K. Zollschan

A. Preliminary Considerations and Assumptions:

1) The Institutionalization Frame of Reference bases itself upon the assumption of the emergence of personality, social, and cultural forms out of simple elements which are to be specified below. In emphasising the emergence of forms, the frame of reference contains potentialities for genetic (or "natural history"), structural, and conflict types of analysis of personality and social systems.

2) In common with Max Weber and Talcott Parsons action is considered to be the process which forms the subject matter for personality, social and cultural studies. However, rather than being taken as a primitive category, action--in the first instance--is viewed as any motion which propells the actor from a given *status quo* to a specifiable goal. Where no motions to change (or "actively" to maintain) the *status quo* occur, we speak of inertia.

3) For purposes of analysis, inertia is considered to be the initial state of any actor prior to the emission of action. Action on part of the actor occurs because of disturbances of inertia.

4) Action can be emitted only by actors; analysis of action, therefore, must take place with reference to the relevant actors. In first approximation we may say that any individual social actor is co-terminous with a human organism operating on the level of meaning. This approach lays itself open to criticism as a form of psychologism, but such criticism is methodologically unsound since the actor is viewed as being located in situations which are, in some sense, exterior, constraining, and perhaps even coercive for him. Rather than psychologism, the frame of reference conforms to the tenets of what has been called "methodological individualism".

B. Organismic Behavior:

Although the theory of institutionalization is primarily concerned with action on the level of meaning--involving events in the personality, social, and cultural realms--it grows out of a wider conception of behavior. Again, we begin by assuming an initial state of behavioral inertia.

Definitions: (Primary Process) a. A stimulus is any event or situation eliciting behavior ("responses") from the organism.

b. Stimuli occur both within the organism (somatic stimuli) and in the organism's environment (external stimuli).

c. Restoration of inertia by behavior we call gratification.

Propositions: (Primary Process) 1. Where inertia is not restored by behavior the organism initially reacts by:

1.1 hallucinations of gratification, and/or by;

1.21 discharges of affect into expressive behavior (kicking and howling, e.g.) and/or through;

1.22 Anxiety and somatization.

2. Prolongued delay of gratification results in the establishment within the organism of control and defense structures.

2.1 Binding transforms behavioral energy into a quiescent state (potential energy) which can become available for secondary process behavior.

2.2 Primary Repression in which the stimulus and its ideational representation are denied from motility and consciousness.

2.21 In connection with the extirpation or avoidance of external as distinct from somatic stimuli Freud speaks of a stimulus shield as a functional equivalent of primary repression.

2.3 Repetition which is the attempted mastery of environmental inconstancy by behavioral constancy.

3. "Structuralized Delay" (mediated by defense and control structures) results in:

3.1 Detour activity (searching for) and means activity (reaching for) gratifying objects or objectives.

3.2 Cognitive mapping ("experiments in thought") without short-cuts to hallucination.

Corollary: Secondary process does not achieve complete tension discharge (return to inertia) but gives way to behavior compatible with the maintenance of tension. Thus behavioral equilibrium replaces behavioral inertia, and gratification is replaced by satisfaction. Behavioral equilibrium may, however, be considered as action inertia.

Definitions: (Secondary Prosess) d. Behavior leading to gratification may be called a behavioral jump.

e. A particular sequence of behavior leading to satisfaction may be called a pathway.

f. Gratification or satisfaction reached through a given behavior may be called an objective.

g. Any thing, person, symbol, or group through or in which objectives are attained is an object.

C. The Formation of the Social Actor:

The transition from general considerations of organismic behavior to considerations of specifically social action is mediated by Weber's "level of meaning". For the theory of institutionalization this implies that articulation is interposed between the stimulus (redefined as an exigency) and the responsive behavior (redefined as action). Thus meaningful action for us is distinguished from mere behavior by being preceded by articulation. Articulation (to be fully discussed in section D. infra) involves the transformation of an exigency into an expressible need with associated goals. Though touched off by the relative strength of saliency of an exigency, articulation requires the actor to have more or less systematic horizons of justifications and cognitive expectations. In order to be an actor and not just a human organism, horizons of justifications and expectations must be present--at least in elementary form.

Hypothetical Postulates: 1. Three systems are operative in governing secondary process behavior:

1.1 The internal system, liable to disturbances in the first place by primarily somatic stimuli. Inertia is restored by gratification. Where gratification is not possible, inertia is replaced by an equilibrium of stimuli so as to minimise total excitation. The system may be defined as the equilibrium of excitations or equilibrium of deprivations. Any new stimulus or excitation that upsets this equilibrium constitutes an affective discrepancy.

1.2 A system created in the first place by the impingement of the environment upon the (infant) organism's behavior. Equilibrium here consists of environmental constancy, disturbances of which are "assimilated" perhaps by repetition. Conceptions of pattern and order are outgrowths of the attempt to master such disturbances, giving rise to ground rules or proto-patterns. Out of the melange of primitive proto-patterns the horizon of justifications becomes differentiated. When a disturbance "offends" a proto-pattern we speak of an *evaluative discrepancy*.

1.3 When the tensions arising in the absence of gratification interact with early proto-patterns a third system emerges--knowledge. Knowledge may be conceived of as an *horizon of expectations*. When an expectation is disappointed by an observation we speak of a *cognitive discrepancy* or *falsification*.

2. When an equilibrium of excitations (involving, in addition, an ordering of excitations by their priority or "salience") and horizons of justifications and expectations are extablished, secondary process behavior is replaced by meaningful action (see D. *infra*).

3. Inter-organism behavior is a biological requisite for survival among certain species. (i.e. where it does not occur the species does not survive). For instance, certain minimal relations between mothers and their infants are built into the biological structure of mammals.

3.1 Human infants, because of their prolongued biological dependency upon adult humans, necessarily exist and mature in environments populated by others--and consisting in large part of situations created by the presence of others (notably the mother).

3.21 The preponderance of others in the child's experiential environment (as also, of course, the human infant's dependency in itself) imply that early gratification and satisfaction are obtained through and in others. Thus, in the case of the somatic stimulus of hunger, the mothers breast becomes (in Freudian terms) the earliest "drive object". The utility of the mother for the infant in reaching various "objects" (i.e. in re-establishing inertia or equilibrium after disturbances by various excitations) establishes the infant's cathexis to the mother as an "object".

3.22 The preponderance of other humans in the child's environment also implies that many of the impingements of the environment upon the infant will be through and by other humans. Proto-patterns and justifications in the nascent actor are therefore affected very strongly by the actions directed towards him by others.

3.23 The strongly inter-organismic character of the infantile human's experience implies the centrality of communication (language and/or body language) in the development of knowledge.

Definitions: a. Where horizons of justifications and expectations overlap considerably in a collectivity of humans we speak of culture.

b. The development of horizons of justifications and expectations in an actor such that they overlap considerably with those of other members of his collectivity we call socialization.

Corollaries: 1) The inter-organismic character of human life implies that individual horizons of justifications and expectations are formed largely in situations of interaction. Since a large degree of overlap is dictated by the extent of interaction in the human collectivity, culture and individual personalities emerge concurrently. Both are at the same level of analysis.

2) Since the social actor is an emergent out of the mutual interactions of the equilibrium of excitations, horizon of justifications, and horizon of expectations, and of modifications in these systems in response to new exigencies, earlier forms of personality structure strongly determine the forms of later modifications. Hence the Freudian contention regarding the paradigmatic importance of the first years of life is supported by our frame of reference. This does not imply, of course, that modifications in face of new exigencies do not continue through the life of the actor. How fundamental such modifications can be is a question for further analysis and research.

Note: This is a transitional section between B & D. Some of the terms here employed are defined and expanded in section D.

D. Articulation and Action:

Definitions: a. An exigency is any event or situation discrepant from a desired or expected state.

b. The salience of an exigency is a measure of the strength of the discrepancy or, alternatively, of the degree of disturbance of the equilibrium of excitations.

c. The justifiability or counter-justifiability of an exigency is the degree to which the recognition or definition of an exigency is proper or improper.

d. The specifiability of an exigency is the degree to which the exigency can be exactly located and defined as a need.

e. Articulation is the recognition (whether correctly or falsely) of the existence and nature of an exigency.

f. A need is an articulated exigency. A latent need is one which can be imputed by an observer but has not been articulated by the actor. Typically a latent need exists in situations where an exigency is potential and has not become actualized. A manifest need exists for the actor who has articulated an exigency.

g. A goal is any objective associated with the removal or diminution of a need. (Currently I conceive of a motive as being synonymous with a goal.)

h. Action is any behavior intended to attain a goal.

Discussion: A manifest need and its associated goals may be preconscious or even unconscious at any moment of time, but they must be expressible in articulate form. This does not imply that all unconscious needs and goals referred to in psychoanalysis are manifest. A manifest as distinct from a latent unconscious goal may be inferred where unconsciously intended action occurs.

Propositions: 1. Any exigency is composed of one or a combination of the following discrepancies: affective, evaluative, and cognitive (see C 1.1, 1.2 & 1.3).

2. Articulation is a function of the salience, justifiability, and specifiability of an exigency. The nature of the articulated need will depend upon these co-ordinates.

Definitions: i. The valence of a need and/or a goal is its priority or relative importance in the value hierarchy of an actor.

j. The attainability of a goal refers to the knowledge necessary to the actor for reaching the goal to the extent that such knowledge is available to him. The use of available knowledge for attaining goals we may call application.

k. The legitimacy of a goal refers to the propriety of the goal (or of the actions necessary for its attainment) to the actor or to others in a position to judge the actor.

l. The elasticity of the goal refers to the degree to which it is substitutable by other goals.

m. Wertrational action is any intended behavior adequate for attaining the goal. (It may be alternatively interpreted as the "best available" action, which is adequate.)

n. Zweckrational action is the apportionment of intended behaviors among goals such that they are attained according to the degree of their valency.

o. Valence dissonance is a contradiction between two or more goals either intra-personally or (in a relationship) interpersonally. Intra-personally it has been termed ambivalence.

p. Cognitive dissonance is a contradiction between two or more applications or methods of attaining a goal or, alternatively, between two or more goals cognitively associated with a given need. It can be viewed as either intra or inter personal.

q. Evaluative dissonance is a contradiction between two or more legitimations of a need, goal, or actions necessary to reach a goal. Again, it can be viewed as either intra or inter personal.

Propositions: 3. Action is a function of the valence, attainability, and legitimacy of a goal.

4. Dissonance (of the varieties defined in o., p., & q. above) constitutes a second order exigency, i.e. there is a "tendency toward consonnance".

4.1 Where dissonance is intrapersonal (individual second order exigency) consonnance can occasionally be established by the rearticulation of needs.

4.12 Where the re-articulation of needs in order to establish consonnance is not feasible the actor experiences alienation (see section H).

4.2 Where dissonance is interpersonal (colleative second order exigency) individual action to establish consonnance may take three broad forms, as follows:

4.21 Compromise, in which one or more of the dissonant parties rearticulate the relevant need.

4.22 Subordination, in which the subordinate party or parties resign the relevant goals to alienation.

4.23 Conflict, in which the goals and viewpoints of a party relevant to the situation of dissonance become articulated as an interest.

E. The Development of the Personality:

In section D. of the propositional calculus exigencies, needs, goals, and actions have been viewed somewhat atomistically. In studying the maintenance of patterns of action we enter the realms of personality and social systems proper. Thus personality may be viewed as a more or less coherent system of persistent patterns of activity emanating from an actor. It is useful to begin by reference to a set of symbolic abbreviations:

Let A = Action
G = The Originating Goal of the action
X = Unanticipated Exigencies consequent upon the action
Y = Unanticipated Gains (i.e. goals and objectives [see B. f.] attained by the action, for which the action was not intended).
Z = No consequences (or irrelevant consequences)

Further, let an arrow → denote the consequence of the action. (Thus $A \rightarrow G$ implies that the action in question leads to attainment of the goal.)

Definitions: a. Where a need can be removed by a single act we may speak of a goal jump ($A \rightarrow G$). (see also B. d.)

b. Where a need connot be extinguished by a goal jump but requires prolongued activity in the direction of the goal we may speak of a pathway. (see also B. e.)

Propositions: 1. Action in the direction of a goal becomes extinguished under the following conditions:

1.1 $A \rightarrow G$; a successful goal jump removing the need.

1.21 $A \rightarrow Z$ or $A \rightarrow X$; where the elasticity of the goal is high, leading to the substitution of the originating goal by another goal conceived as adequate to the nedd but requiring differant action.

1.22 $A \rightarrow X$; leading to a re-articulation of the need.

1.31 $A \rightarrow Z$ where the need is a temporary one

1.32 $A \rightarrow Z$ where (and as long as) the valency of the need is low. This is not a strict example of action being extinguished since an action potential remains which can become actualized when there is a shift in relative valencies (i.e. a change in the equilibrium of deprivations).

2. Action in the direction of a goal persists under the following conditions:

2.1 A→G; where the need is an enduring one (where there is an enduring bombardment by the exigency).

2.21 A→G; where the goal is a distant one requiring a prolongued pathway.

2.22 A→Y; where the unanticipated gains are enduring (meet enduring extraneous needs and objectives).

2.23 Any combination of 2.21 and 2.22 above.

2.31 A→Z; where failuee to reach the goal does not become a second order exigency (i.e. transmuted into A→X). This case might be described as *simple ritualism*.

2.32 A→Z; where the articulation of the second order exigency is not (or cannot be) accompanied by a rearticulation of the originating goal. This is a case of irrational action, and describes alienative ritualism. (see also section H.)

2.321 A→G+X; where G is attained as in cases 2.1 or 2.21, and X is the "cost" attached to attaining G. With respect to X considered alone, the action conforms to 2.32 above, but where the valence of G outweighs the valence of avoiding X the action is Zweckrational.

3. Any prolongued pathway is divisible into "stations" or subgoals which follow each other in more or less sequential order.

3.1 Once a given pathway is established it becomes the route along which action may pass in order to reach additional goals. Various initially discrete goals may thus become atations along a pathway.

3.11 A new exigency will tend to be articulated in terms of needs which can be satisfied along existing pathways. This may be described as the *principle of overdetermination* or of *conservation of action*.

Definitions: c. The *personality* may be loosely and provisionally defined as any given actor's network of action pathways together with the principles governing the formation of new pathways in the actor.

d. The process where an object (see B. g.) acquires the character of a goal in itself is termed *cathexis*.

e. Where representations of self (arising in the course of travel along pathways) acquire continuity over time and across pathways we may speak of *identity*.

Propositions: 4. Any object through which a pathway is directed can become cathected as well as subsequently decathected (i.e. cathexis is "mobile").

4.1 The actor's representation of self along any pathway can itself become an object.

4.11 Where a high degree of identity becomes established in the actor his representations of self approximates to a single object.

Definitions: f. Energy is the action potential of a goal and is measurable by the terms salience and valency. The "energy of an actor" is an ambiguous high order abstraction which I would like to avoid at this time--clearly it has reference to the degree of elaboration of personality structure which determines the number and variety of goals attainable by the actor in a given space of time.

g. Identification occurs where representations of self become highly congruous or isomorphic with representations of a cathected object where this object is another person or a group.

F. The Development of Interpersonal Relations:

Propositions: 1. An interpersonal relation will occur where a goal exists for persons for the response of others, or where it requires conjoint activity of several persons for its attainment.

Definitions: a. Alter is a generic term to be used for another person, several other persons, or a group, other than the person under discussion.

b. An originating goal is the manifest goal for which a relationship develops. (A→G; relative to the relationship)

c. An extraneous goal is a goal for the attainment of which a person enters a relationship which, however, is not the originating goal of the relationship. (A→Y; relative to the relationship)

d. A complementary relationship is one in which the originating goal is for the response of alter.

e. A co-operative relationship is one in which the goal requires the conjoint activity of several.

f. The following paradigm defines the terms: mutual complementarity, manipulative complementarity, simple co-operation, and transactional co-operation.

Motivation of the Actor. **Type of Relationship.**

	Complementary:	Co-operative:
Origination Goal:	Mutual Complementarity	Simple Co-operation
Extraneous Goal:	Manipulative Complementarity	Transactional Co-operation.

Propositions: 2. For a relationship or interpersonal pattern to become mobilized there must be a minimal degree of valence consonnance, cognitive consonance, and evaluative consonance (See D. o., p., & q.).

Definitions: g. Any interpersonal pattern through which a person's pathway to a goal is chanelled may be termed a chanel.

Propositions: 3. An interpersonal pattern becomes extinguished under the following conditions:

3.1 A→G; where the need for complementarity or co-operation is removed by attainment of the goal.

3.21, 3.22, 3.31, 3.32 as E 1.21 etc.

4. For an interpersonal pattern to be maintained (i.e. for an enduring chanel to be established) the following conditions are required:

4.1 A→G; for a sufficient number of parties to the relationship, where the need is an enduring one.

4.21 A→G; for a suffieient number of parties where the goal is a distant one requiring a prolongued chanel.

4.22 A→Y; where the extraneous goal is enduring in a situation of transactional co-operation or manipulative complementarity.

4.23 Any combination of 4.1, 4.21, & 4.22 above.

4.31, 4.32, & 4.321 as E 2.31 etc. for any given person in the relationship. (The "action" in question here is, of course, interaction).

5. Once a given channel is established it becomes the route through which many individual pathways may be channelled.

5.1 New needs for complementary or conjoint action will tend to be routed through existing channels where apropriate. This may be termed the principle of conservation of structure.

Definitions: h. Social Structure is the ramified system of relatively enduring channels existing in a society.

i. A role is any activity required to maintain an enduring interaction channel. In other words, we conceive of ego's role as the expectations of alters that ego will continue to interact with them in such a way as to enable the channel to remain open for their pathways. (These expectations may differ according to the class of alters considered, thus giving rise to Merton's concept of the role set.)

Discussion: The propositional complex C 3 and corrolaries C 1 & 2 may now be expanded somewhat; they assert (when put into the language developed in this section) that a person's behavioral pathways are, to a significant extent, interpersonally channelled from infancy. In the formation of cognitive and evaluative consonance with alters in the early channels through which the person routes his pathways to objectives and later to articulated goals, can also be seen the development of horizons of expectations and justifications out of their bio-psychic matrices. Certainly articulation, when seen as the verbalization of expectations and justification, is interpersonal in origin since language is an interpersonal invention.

Another word may be added on the question of consonance. Proposition F 2 is stated in a rather weak fashion by design because, quite clearly, persons in relationships often have disagreements on values and act at cross purposes from a cognitive standpoint. There even exist "parataxic" relationships which (for reasons of extraneous, and often unconscious goals) persist in spite, and perhaps because of, dissonance. But even such comedies (or tragedies) or errors require the existence of minimal consonance at some level in order for the relationship to be possible at all. In extreme form such dissonant relationships tend to involve very few persons.

There are, of course, also large scale systems of relationships which exist for the institutionalization of conflict. But here there is, again, some minimal consonance regarding the rules of war and, propably, at least a similacrum of a common language.

Non institutionalized conflict or outright situatuions of "war to the death" connot fall within our definition of relationship.

G. Cultural Dynamics and Macrosociology:

Discussion: Following Schneider we may draw a distinction between motivational and synergic levels of analysis in the behavioral sciences. The former, in our terms, would refer to considerations involving goals, the formation of goals, and actions leading towards goals. The "...latter refers precisely to the conjoint effects of motivated action...in its results for the social system". Personally, I prefer the terms micro and macro sociology to Schneider's terminology, using them by analogy to their use in economies. Clearly, our discussion to this point (and particularly in section F) has been microsociological, keeping the actor and his goals as the constant point of reference. There are, however, as Schneider very correctly suggests, other possible points of reference in the study of economic and sociocultural systems, in which the disposition of the actor and the nature of his goals become secondary considerations. Although the Institutionalization Frame of Reference is micro-sociological, elucidation of its relationship with macro-sociological phenomena can serve to avert confusion.

Postulates: 1. Ecological considerations have to do with situations in which whole categories of actors are faced by similar exigencies because of their location in space or in social structure. Thus the series of exigencies and articulations that lead to the formation of residential aggregates (i.e. cities) give rise to new exigencies springing from the fact of aggregation itself.

2. Economic considerations have to do with situations in which categories of actors have similar goals. Their simulataneous activity in pursuit of such goals itself affects the attainability of the goals. The most clearly analysed example of such phenomena to date may be found in price theory, the theory of economic cycles, and in the theory of games.

3. Cultural considerations have to do with the vehicles used by actors to travel along their pathways and through their interpersonal channels. By "vehicles" we may understand such things as languages, technologies and instruments, and legitimations.

It is a peculiar property of vehicles that they are not constructed de novo by actors travelling along a pathway, but evolve interpersonally and are "inherited" by actors in processes of socialisation and cultural assimilation. This is not to say that the actor who inherits a vehicle does not or cannot modify it; on the contrary, small modifications in vehicles occur constantly and are the essence of cultural change.

3.1 The unsuitability of a given vehicle for an actor in pursuit of goals, itself comes to constitute an exigency for the actor (with a high loading of evaluative and cognitive discrepancies. See C 1.2 & 1.3) and the modification of the vehicle can itself become a goal for him.

3.2 The unwitting modification of vehicles may also occur because of imperfections or selectivity in their tradition (or "inheritance" --I use the word "tradition" as a verb in its original sense of "handing on" or "handing down").

The distinction between postulates 3.1 and 3.2 may be illustrated by changes in a language of common use that occur because of the activities of poets and writers (3.1), and because of the prevalence of illiterates in the society (3.2). These processes might be called repectively, negative entropy (creation of new organization) and entropy (loss of organization) of a vehicle.

3.3 The justifiability and specifiability of a goal are functions of the vehicles at the disposal of the actor. This enables us to view horizons of expectations and justifications in a new light; namely, as "vehicle pools" at the disposal of the actor.

3.4 Socialization, acculturation, and diffusion are the major processes of tradition. Each is a form of learning and involves selection on part of the actor which is done in terms of his expectations at any given point in time.

3.41 Tradition of vehicles, since it enriches the receiving actor's horizons, may lead to the articulation of new goals to satisfy old and enduring needs. Thus socialization (in the guise of higher education) may lead to a shift in preference from folk ballads to chamber music as goals suitable for satisfying "musical needs"; acculturation (of , say, a wealthy Hungarian immigrant) may involve a shift from gulyasz to rare steak as a goal suitable for satisfying "hunger"; diffusion (of, say, electric illumination) may involve a shift from the goal of "nocturnal safety" (involving restriction of action) to that of indulging in "night life" (involving an expansion of activity). In the last mentioned example, the need for safety in the dark is substantially met by the introduction of electric light, thus enabling other needs (for "amusement") to be met more fully. It illustrates what is meant by the phrase: "revolution of rising expectations".

The articulation of new goals as a result of tradition of a vehicle may have an effect upon action as profound as articulation elicited by a major exigency.

4. Macro-structural considerations have to do with the existence of a system of channels at any time, through which an actor may channel his pathways. The principle of conservation of structure (E 5.1) lends social structure whatever degree of "permamence' it may posess. (Compare this view with that of functionalism.)

5. "Social currents" such as fads, fashions, and even "ends of ideology" and ideological resurgences, may be interpreted as complex outcomes of ecological, economic, and cultural conditions.

Note: This section attempts to explore areas that I have hithertoo neglected, and thus cannot remotely compare with other sections in tightness and cogency. Its appearance here in such untidy form is dictated by our immediate needs.

H. Alienation:

Propositions: 1. A person who has a goal which is problematic yet cannot be relinquished (i.e. is inelastic, see D 1.) is in a predicament of alienation.

1.1 A goal is problematic when, from the point of view of the actor, it is unachievable, unpredictable, not shared, not legitimate, or any combination of these (except that unachievability and unpredictability cannot logically appear in combination--an unachievable goal must be predictably so).

1.11 A goal which is unachievable gives rise to frustration.

1.12 A goal which is unpredictable gives rise to anxiety.

1.13 A goal which is not shared gives rise to shame.

1.14 A goal which is not legitimate gives rise to guilt or fear of punishment.

1.2 Each of the four conditions of alienation enumerated in 1.1 above corresponds to a second order exigency--anxiety, shame, guilt, fear of punishment, and, in a sense, frustration itself, may be viewed as second order exigencies. Where the second order exigency becomes correctly articulated as a need, each of the conditions of alienation correspond to the frustration of that need. Frustration (or unachievability) is thus the paradigmatic principle of alienation, whether it is of the originating goal itself or of the second order goals of avoiding anxiety, shame, guilt, or fear.

1.21 In the case of a goal being unreachable, the need frustrated is the one associated with the originating goal (i.e. the goal under consideration).

1.22 In the case of the goal being unpredictable the need frustrated may be termed the *need for security*.

1.23 In the case of a goal being non shared, the need frustrated may be termed the *need for affiliation*.

1.24 In the case of a goal being non legitimate, the need frustrated may be termed the *need for approval* (including self-approval).

1.3 Some problematic goals present a choice between pathways involving various conditions of alienation (enumerated in 1.1).

1.31 Where a choice between pathways is available, that condition of alienation will be chosen in which the need to be frustrated is the least valent one.

1.32 Where a choice between conditions of alienation is available and the needs frustrated are of equal valency, vaccilation between pathways can occur.

1.4 Where an *objective* as distinct from a *goal* is unachievable, propositions B 1-3 become relevant.

1.41 Where anxiety, shame, guilt, and fear remain unarticulated exigencies they may appear in diffused form through out the behavior of the actor. Under these circumstances they may be described as "free-floating".

1.42 Anxiety, shame, guilt, and fear can become falsely articulated. They need not necessarily be connected with the originating goal in whose pursuit they were aroused.

Corrolary: Strictly speaking, an inelastic objective would have to be defined as one whose frustration over a length of time is incompatible with the viability of the organism. It should be noted, however, that secondary process behavior and activity is the result of delay in the achievement of objectives, not of their total frustration.

Definitions: Definitions a-d have to do with the question of whether a condition of alienation is objectively "real" or not. They may be presented with reference to the question: "is the goal problematic" as answered (subjectively) by the actor and by some hypothetical "all-knowing" observer (objectively).

Is the Goal Problematic?

	Actor:	Observer:
a. Alienation Proper	Yes	Yes
b. Inhibition. (Pseudo-alienation)	Yes	No
c. Psuedo-potency	No	Yes
d. Potency	No	No

e. Where a person exhibits psuedo-potency with respect to a large number of goals, he may be described as pseudo-omnipotent.

Propositions: 2. There are levels of accomodation to problematic goals, according to their valency. Threshholds of these levels for any given actor are a matter for empirical investigation --to some degree they have to do with the precariousness or solidity of balance of the actor's equilibrium of excitations.

2.1 The first level of accomodation to alienation involves tolerance of frustration, shame, anxiety, guilt, or fear without marked modification of thought and action. When movement from one condition of alienation to another is possible, the least salient is chosen.

2.11 Where non-legitimate action can occur with easily tolerable levels of guilt or fear, deliquency is a probable outcome. (Note: where guilt or fear are not experienced at all by the actor, the goal in question is not a problematic one--this may, of course, be function of pseudo-potency arising either out of ignorance or out of personality distortion).

2.2 The second level of accomodation to alienation involves the following:

2.21 Ritualism: Here action flows along a pathway to the goal even though the goal cannot be reached. It is to be assumed that such a pathway (which, as it were, leads "nowhere") will not be maintained over a long period of time unless extraneous goals can be satisfied en route (e.g. one may not learn anything at school, but one can still get "grades") or unless marked distortion of the personality (discussed in 1.3 and below) appears.

2.22 Inhibition of conflicting goals of lesser valency than the goal in question, thereby rendering the latter less problematic.

2.23 Sub-clinical reactions to frustration, shame, guilt, anxiety, and fear. These may take the form of "nervousness", hyperalertness, hyperactivity, diffuse aggressiveness, and mild somatization.

2.24 Any combination of 2.21, 2.22, & 2.23.

2.3 The third level of accomodation to alienation involves the following:

2.31 Repression of the goal, with unconscious--more or less focused--ritualistic derivative actions.

2.32 Isolation of affect attached to the goal, rendering the latter's frustration tolerable but involving more or less focused compulsive ritualistic action or obsessive ritualistic thought.

2.33 Reaction formation involving more or less focused compulsive ritualistic action or obsessive ritualistic thought running counter to the pathway toward the goal.

2.34 Clinical reactions to frustration, anxiety, shame, guilt, and fear. These may involve pathological aggression, anxiety states, severe somatization, phobic states, and neurotic melancholia.

2.4 The fourth level of reactions to alienation ceases to constitute any form of "accomodation" properly speaking, since it involves the destruction of personality (action networks) and reversal to more or less elaborated forms of primary process behavior. Strictly speaking, the condition of elasticity ceases to operate at this point, since pathways to goals become disrupted and destroyed. Psychosis and psychopathy are the symptomatic presentations of these conditions of partial or total depersonalization.

2.5 Extreme accomodations to alienation or depersonalization (the third and fourth levels) will occur either where the valency of the inelastic problematic goal is overwhelmingly imperious, or where there are several cumulative sources of alienation, or where the balance of the equilibrium of excitation is strategically disrupted.

3. False articulation (where it does not occur simply because of ignorance alone) is a by-product of alienation. Thus, for example, the frustration of a goal may lead to the accumulation of the affect of diffuse aggression in the equilibrium of excitations. The presence of this strain may lead to the articulation of goals

which syphon off the aggression--say, the scapegoating of minority groups.

Corrolaries: 1. The principle of conservation of action, (see E 3.11) may be called upon to account for the emergence of derivative and diffuse acts which contaminate pathways in themselves not blocked or problematic. Such "coloration" of pathways unconnected with the alienative goal may be quite unconscious and may occur on the levels of primary and secondary process behavior as well as on the level of articulated action.

2. The articulation of a goal may not derive its salience solely from the precipitating exigency, but also from strains in the equilibrium of excitations deriving from blocked or conflicting (i.e. "problematic") goals.

Definitions: By slight modification of the inelasticity assumption with respect to problematic goals, the concepts of regression and fixation may be introduced. The modification involves a definition of goal substitutability relative to the existing elaboration of action pathways in the actor.

f. Fixation involves structured incapacity on part of the actor to develop new pathways.

g. Regression involves the reversion, on part of the actor, to earlier pathways in face of problematic goals.

h. Sublimation involves the reconstruction of new pathways subsequent to regression. Construction of the most original and daring new pathways may occur after initial regression.

APPENDIX B: SOME SPECULATIONS ON MOTIVATION AND THE CLASSROOM: CONTROLLED FALSIFICATIONS, AUTONOMY, AND ACHIEVEMENT.*

In the preceding theory, we have attemped to be rigorous, explicit, and precise. At some time in such an effort, however, it is important to forego precision in favor of speculation, to venture beyond the limited arena in which, and for which, we have developed our intricate maps, to take the maps into the throughfares and by-ways beyond the arena in order to gain some feeling for their relevance to the stuff of on-going life. Such exploration, of course, requires that we not only dare to speculate, but also to make assumptions, interpretations, and even rank assertions that are unsubstantiated, and which could well eventually prove quite wrong. The game is academically risky, but it is well worth the candle, even in an era of electric lights.

Underlying the following speculations are propositions consistent with the foregoing theory, even though all have not yet been formally developed.

First, pathways and goals are products of the experiencing individual-in-situation (that is, they are all learned); crucial to the development and elaboration of pathways and goals is experienced falsification which leads to exigency.

Second, although other factors are also important, various saliencies of exigency will have varying effect:

A. Extreme exigency will lead to attempts (selection of pathways and goals) to most immediately dissolve the discrepancy, likely through escape (such as reaction formation, denial, repression);

B. Moderate exigency may lead to efforts to reorganize horizons (including, especially, the goal arrays, or ideal-self) in order to dissolve the discrepancy in a way most consistant with the existing horizons; the effect of this may be elaboration and refinement of horizons;

C. Mild or no exigency (no falsification or established horizons or goals) will lead to atrophy of the horizons.

Third, it follows there can be varying development of the horizons of knowledge, and horizons of justification, and varying cathexes in these horizons. Hence, we might also speak of varying developments of self ideal and self image. Further, any combinations of levels of development among these elements is possible.

---

*By Donald A. Hansen

Fourth, beyond the level of development of horizons, variations of content can be expected. In influencing the variations, every falsifying experience can be seen as important, but the early experiences are especially influential. In this stance, we are somewhat similar to Freud in his emphasis on early experience in influencing later developments. But our perspective is somewhat different: we suggest that (as is implied in the principle of conservation, etc.) early experiences limit the possibilities, but that these limitations are not necessarily rigidly fixed, hence possibilities which have once been denied may be quite undramatically regained through later experience. "Psychic reorganization" (which Freudians would suggest is essential) is not necessarily, nor usually required: the possibilities may be regained simply through later elaboration. Such simple regaining of once denied possibilities is demonstrated in children from vacuous homes, who in response to a more experience-rich environment may blossom quickly, however late.

The following speculations, which make use of these implications, are necessarily very limited in scope, intended to be merely suggestive of further research and theory. They make no pretense to be definitive, or to offer policy implications.

To further simplify the complex task we take a very simple view of education and the classroom. First, we focus only on two general objectives related to motivation that might be imputed to education: to encourage individual "autonomy," and to instill desire for "achievement". Second, we shall take the classroom to be a formally structured situation, including a middle-class teacher in some special relationship to thirty or so children from a relatively homogeneous middle-class, urban, American neighborhood, and in which teachers and students share basically similar language codes.*

---

*Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, "Values, Motives, and Systems of Action." in Parsons and Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 47-275.

The Classroom and Falsifications

Perhaps the most impressive thing in the child's first school experiences is exposure to an entirely new way of relating to other persons. Classroom and family relations are markedly dissimilar, and in many ways directly contradictory. The differences can be appreciated in comparing the parent-child with the teacher-child on the Parsons-Shils "pattern variables".[*]

1. Ascribed status vs. achieved status: The child first enters school with horizons of expectations and justifications and cathexes which have developed within a network of ascribed statuses, in which expectations and justifications are, in great part, based on biologic status, particularly on age, sex, and sibling order. The classroom, however, is composed of children roughly comparable in biologic status. By design, emphasis is placed on achievement: though in early meetings children are treated as essentially equal, as they progress through the year and through the grades, statuses are increasingly differentiated on the basis of their classroom performance.

2. Affective vs. disciplined behavior: The child's horizons have also developed in a situation which is comparatively permissive of emotional expression. Even though after the first year he is exposed to increasing falsifications of his impulse to immediate gratification, at the time he enters school he still enjoys comparative affective freedom in the family. In the school, however, the child is subject to situations in which few impulses are allowed immediate gratification. From the start, discipline is continuing, relatively severe, and general compared to that in the family. Failure to restrain all but a few impulses in the classroom will meet with rebuke, or even (in some instances) physical punishment.

3. Special expectations vs. general standards: Another characteristic of the family situation in which the child's horizons have developed is that expectations and evaluations are set with close attention to the unique likes, habit patterns, capacities, etc., of the child. In the classroom, however, he meets an entirely different system of justifications and expectations: He is expected to act, in very important ways, similar to every other child in his class. That is, he is judged by general standards rather than by special expectations or evaluations, and as Parsons notes, the situation is so structured that

---

[*] *Ibid*.

the teacher must limit any tendencies to treat any children as "pets" or "scapegoats".*

4. Specific vs. diffuse expectations and evaluations: In the classroom, not only is the child treated as one of a type, expectations and evaluations are also made only of a very limited range of his total activities and capacities. In the family, expectations and evaluations are diffuse: the child and parent relate to one another as fully complex humans, setting expectations and evaluating one another in the context of many aspects of their relationship and of the relationship they know the other to have with other persons. In the classroom, however, the teacher is primarily concerned only with specific expectations and evaluating the child's activity specifically, without great concern for any of his non-classroom activities.

5. Collective vs. private interests: In the family, the child is allowed and encouraged in a comparatively wide array of activities which are oriented primarily towards self interests (including, of course, his cathected relations to parents and other objects). The classroom, by comparison, emphasizes a collectivity orientation in choice of actions and in evaluation. Increasingly as the child progresses through school, the general orientation of teachers and other school authorities emphasizes responsibility to the collectivity, and attempts to encourage his selections of actions on the basis of collective values.

The child, then, enters school with horizons developed in the special environment of the family, and from the first day in the classroom he is bombarded with falsifying experiences. His lot is not easy: what is required is marked reorganization of horizons of expectations and justifications, formation of new goals, and even decathexes of old goals. The bombardment of falsifications is not introduced with full force, of course; each of the five qualitative differences the child confronts in classroom relations becomes increasingly marked as the child progresses through the curriculum.

It takes no theoretical argument for the sensitive teacher to realize that the abrupt falsification of cathected relations could be disastrous to the child's progress, leading to rejection or to reaction against the teacher, classroom, and education. The implications opening this section also suggest, however, that the teacher in the early years who is overly protective, and attempts to too closely emulate the role of the parent, particularly of the mother, may retard elaboration of the horizons in such a way that the aims of education (and, in great part, of the middle-class parent himself) never will be effectively realized.

---

*Talcott Parsons, "The School Class as a Social System: Some of Its Functions in American Society," Harvard Educational Review, 29 (1959), 297-318.

As the child is experiencing the tension between family and classroom relations, he is also developing a new set of relations with his peers. Although peer relationships vary far more in type than classroom relationships, and more even than family relationships, we might suggest (admittedly rather inaccurately) that they are roughly similar to the family in special (vs. standard) expectations, somewhere intermediate between family and classroom in descriptive-achievement and in diffuse-specific emphases, and more affectively permissive than either family or classroom. (These characterizations are extremely rough, even for generalizations. Indeed, the variation in collectivity-self orientation emphasis among peer groups is so extreme that we would not even attempt a rough characterization.)

Rank Order on Five Qualities of Family, Peer and Teacher Relationships of Child

	Family	Peer	Teacher
Ascription-Achievement	1	2	3
Affective-Neutral	2	1	3
Special-General Standards	1.5	1.5	3
Specific-Diffuse	1	2	3
Individual-Collective	?	?	3

A "1" indicates the relationship is most like the first named aspect of the dichotomy.

Numbers indicate rank orderings only, and represent the most gross of generalizations, based on impression. The table is only intended to illustrate and suggest.

However rough these approximations, they at least illustrate that peer relations offer their own sources of falsification of family-oriented horizons, and may also counteract the falsifications of the school, and hence may also mediate in the falsification processes of the classroom.

It is especially important to remember that even while in the classroom the child is also engaged in peer relationships at the same time he is in relationship with the teacher. This means not only that the potential effect of the teacher may be undermined by the peers, and not only that she might use the peer relations in her teaching techniques (see below), but also that the potential harshness of the teacher-introduced falsifications (which may not be recognized by even the most sensitive teacher) may be alleviated by the peers: a number of children experiencing similar falsifications will tend to support one another in their effort to escape an overly harsh falsification, or to resist a more moderate falsification temporarily or in part so that they can be more smoothly incorporated into their horizons of justification and expectation. In the classroom, then, each child is "in" a triadic relation to peers, family, and teachers. Tension is likely between the three sets of relationship and, there may be an optimal tension, we suggest, for optimal development of horizons of justifications, expectation, and cathexes (goal formations). The importance of this observation should not be missed: We are suggesting that the "conflict-free ego sphere"* may not be optimal either for the aims of education or for the fullest development of the individual. Either can be obtained, this theory suggests, only through controlled falsification, in which exigencies are neither allowed to become so intense that the individual seeks to escape, nor reduced to the conflict-free level. Further, in classroom and curriculum educators must constantly orient their efforts toward the other two sides of the triadic relations of the child.

Speculations on the Development of Autonomy

Complaints about the "homogenizing processes" of our schools often end, "We've got to teach kids how to think for themselves." The prescription is potent. What is usually desired is an increased cognitive independence, or establishment of metapathways rather than simple pathways appropriate only to limited classroom tasks. Some critics especially mean, in addition, the development of "creative" capacities, or of a cognitive playfulness. Usually, however, even the most avid voice for cognitive independence imposes limits, insisting that a modicum of conformity is required for social harmony, and a certain discipline of thought must be instilled to ensure socially useful production from even the independent and creative individual. But, it is cautioned, all too often the legitimate need for some discipline in deportment and thought is only the entree for efforts to mold a conventionalized intelligence; where autonomy of thought might flower, only energetic, conventionalized intelligence is fertilized.

---

*As presented by Heinz Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, N. Y.: International Universities Press, 1958.

The critics do not have a difficult time supporting arguments that in many classrooms the child's efforts toward independent, creative thought are hampered by the teacher, often in efforts to implement acceptable, utilitarian middle-class American ways.*

The problem of cognitive dependency, however, is well known, and has become almost clinched stock for articles and papers. Notable efforts to meet the problem only overshadow many lesser efforts, and to claim that the school actively insists on cognitive dependence is to far overstate the case; at worse, the school today frustrates the cognitively independent; at best it offers him at least some intended encouragement.

But to attain cognitive independence is not attain independence in choice of action, and it is even further short of autonomy. As for independence of action, another element is involved which presents a problem perhaps even more serious than cognitive dependence. The problem involves evaluative dependence, and it is serious partly because it is generally ignored. Free choice of action requires not only cognitive freedom, but freedom to evaluate possibilities from a perspective not impossed by coercion, manipulation or other control; nor impossed (as is so easily the case when evaluative horizons are underdeveloped) by primitive emotion.

Traditionally, the secular school has intentionaly ignored development of the evaluative horizons, excepting in subtle and not-so-subtle efforts to instil national loyalties, values of hard work, achievement and honesty, and other special and often instrumental values. Systematic falsification and elaboration of horizons of evaluation in the past has been the job of especially the family and church, but one of the dominant critical themes of our time is that these institutions no longer effectively stimulate development. If this theme is valid, it might be interpreted as in some ways favorable to development of individual autonomy in evaluation; the family and the church, it could be argued, are among the most conservative elements in our society, and to be freed from their influence and evaluation is to be freed from confining cages.

---

*We would question, however, whether the classroom is more deficient than in the past; indeed, it may be today far more effective than ever in the history of our society. But the common claim of "increased deficiency" is inessential to the general arguement the critics offer; considering the contemporary challenges offered both individual and society, creative independence is a most legitemate concern and may be a most cruicial requirement.

The question is, freed for what? The above theory suggests at least a partial answer: Ideally, freed for participation in an exchange in which the individual's unique horizons of evaluation are bombarded with moderate falsifications which, in essence, urge him to reorganize his horizons in ways ever more internally consistent, adequate to effective relations in the world of which he is a part, and consistent with his own equilibrium of deprivations (through which any "essential being" might be expressed). We are suggesting, that is, that "autonomy" involves far more than cognitive and evaluative independence (or independence in choice of actions); it is, in effect, "sufficient independence", involving an individual relatively free from dictation by either his organismic or social aspects, and possessing horizons of expectation and justification adequately developed and elaborated to allow him to specify and select actions both socially effective and consistent with his horizons and affective commitments. Autonomy requires some sort of effective "self reference" in selection of actions; that is, it requires horizons developed elaborately and consistently, and affective commitment to aspects of those horizons in which organismic as well as social aspects of the individual are effectively integrated. This implies that the child, and even the early adolescent, are capable of only degrees of independence, in which autonomy is at most foreshadowed.

What, then, can be said of development of early independence? The theory above suggests that a major mechanism in development of dependence-independent is cathexis. We have previously stated that it is proper to speak of the individual cathecting an object relation (self and other in situational relationship). Although we have not yet formally developed this aspect of the motivation theory, it appears that various aspects of the object relation can be cathected. Most simply, the cathecting individual may focus on the relationship ("I like it. I want it to continue"), or on the object of the relationship ("I want to be like Daddy"). To avoid confusion, we will term the first type "internalization", as it requires no representation of the object apart from the relation as the agent of satisfaction or pleasure. The second type of cathexis we will term "identification", but immediately introduce a further and most useful distinction, based on the specificity vs. the generality of the object; when the individual would "Like to be like" another specific object (daddy) we may speak of concrete identification; when he would like to be like a general and/or abstract category of objects, we will speak of *generalized identification* (taking generalization to refer also to abstraction).

We suggest that the degree of independence of a child is a direct function of importance, in his choice of pathways, of identifications rather than internalizations; and that (holding other things constant) the more general (and/or abstract) these identifications, the more idependent the child.

The importance of falsifications, then, in introduction of independence in the child cannot be overstressed: it is through falsifications, primarily, that a child specifies more accurately the specific object of the relationship he cathexts; that is, moderate falsifications lead to the greater liklihood both of identifications and of increased generalization of the identification.

It should be quite clear, then, that the falsifications introduced by the differences in family and classroom structure can be of critical importance in development of early independence. For example, Parsons* suggests that, because the teacher is usually a female, the child is confronted with a falsification of his previous conception of "woman", which was based on his experiences with his mother and other women in similar roles. Further, over the years classroom roles offer further constructive falsifications to the child who identifies with the teacher; because of the turnover of individuals, he is led from identification with specific individuals into a general identification.

Obviously, internalization or identification with the teacher or with the teacher role, can be used effectively by the teacher in encouraging or discouraging the development of autonomy.**

---

* Parsons, *op. cit.*

** One useful technique for transforming internalization into an identification with the teacher role, or for increasing the cathexis in identification, is through falsification of the teacher-student relationship. The above theory suggests that the teacher (or parent) attempts to consistently offer satisfaction and pleasures to the child, or to offer him a "conflict-free" situation, may be doing both herself and the child a disservice. In such a situation, most children are not allowed to percieve the pleasure and satisfaction of the relationship; they do not specify the relationship as affectively related. We suggest that *controlled falsification of the teacher-student relationship may be preliminary to cathexis*. (It is important to note, however, that the *relationship* aspect, and not the *object* aspect of the object-

But this is available for working with only a few children; a more general technique is continual and moderate falsification of the horizons (of which any identification is but a small part), leading to continual reelaboration and, hopefully, cathexis of some object relations.

In the earliest grades, as in the pre-school family, little distinction is made between cognitive and evaluative object relations, for the child has not yet differentiated nor elaborated his horizons adequately to recognize or work with such a distinction. Even though the goals of even early grades are essentially cognitive in nature, falsification of the emerging horizons of justification is inevitable, however incidental. But as the child progresses through the grades, the distinction between cognition and evaluation is sharply developed, and the teacher no longer need burden her exercises with evaluative materials. As the child progresses through the curriculum, then, the moderate falsifications necessary to effective development of horizons are directed increasingly at cognitive, and less and less at evaluative horizons. That is, within the classroom the horizons of justification are left to atrophy.

But to atrophy does not mean to vanish; in other relations, the child meets some demanding falsifications, and his horizons of justification do develop, to some extent, in some way. In this development, the classroom does perform in one way: unusual evaluations are harshly falsified. The child who evidences belief in (to offer extreme examples) flagellism as a religious experience, the boy who exhibits effeminate tastes, the girl who professes free love, or any child who evidences unusual evaluations, beliefs or attitudes will be harshly and brutally falsified. The consequences need not be dwelled on; it is sufficient to note that such response to explanations in ideas and values does not encourage independent development of justifications.

---

relationship should be falsified. Falsification of the object (for instance breakdown or crying by a teacher or other evidence that the hero has clay feet may be preliminary only to decathexis). Assuming the relationship is satisfying for the student, temporary, moderately severe falsifications may lead to increased identification and to establishment of a "reciprocity multiplier" once the faulted relationship has been reestablished (increasing further the reward potentials of the relationship). That is, controlled falsification of relationships may win both cooperation and increased love.

Far more important than the teacher in introducing harsh falsification of the unusual is the peer group. Indeed, it appears that in contemporary society, (excepting early, family-oriented years) often the most important source of evaluative falsifications is the child's peer group. The intollerant cruelty of children has often be noted; even in adolescents, with the emerging capacities for empathy and tenderness, only limited deviation from the norm is permitted within one's own clique and "outsiders" are as harshly judged as in earlier years. Whether it might be desirable for the classroom to offer at least temporary respite from these brutalities can be debated, but it does seem clear that few constructive purposes are served when the censure of the peer group is used by the teacher to control the class, to punish a child "who needs discipling", or even to increase the effectiveness of teaching (to "scapegoat", or to "kick a few tempting butts" is all too effective a technique in many interpersonal processes).

To summerize this brief and tentative discussion: however urgent the need for attention to effects of the classroom on cognitive independence, a perhaps more crucial problem is the lack of constructive and continuing falsification of the horizons of justification. Excepting in early grades, constructive falsifications are generally only incidential in the classrooms. Harsh falsifications are the response to any evidence of deviation from a vaguely defined, but relatively narrow range of values.

Since peers, too, usually offer only harsh falsifications, constructive falsifications are inconsistent and intermittent. Hence, it is reasonable to expect many children (and adults) to be capable of only dependent reflection of the values in their immediate situation. A few may prefer and be capable of independence, but too likely it will be an "independent atrophy" (as contrasted with "sufficient independence"), for the constructive falsifications offered by peer groups are inadequate to effective development, and the community offers neither a consistent system of traditional values (in which most could develop a "committed dependence" and some a "committed autonomy") nor adequate structural sources of moderate falsifications which would urge him to elaborate his horizons, to develop a sufficient independence based on a few key values essential to social cohesion and dynamics.

If our speculations are at all valid, the classroom not only shares in this failure to constructively falsify, it also actively encourages dependent reflection; it is often an effective arena for destruction rather than elaboration of justifications.

Speculation, however, is far from demonstration; close investigation and research are needed. If reason for concern is sought, beyond that implied in the contrast of "dependence" and "autonomy", it might be suggested that from the ranks of those children who show early development and elaboration of horizons of justification--that is, whose emotional involvement with their environmant heavily involves evaluative materials--may be recruited the future creative humanists, moralists, the most effective therapists, social workers, etc., just as early dominance of cognitive horizons may prelude scientific achievement. We are suggesting, then, that whether intentionally or not, the classroom may be discouraging development of many types of persons whose scarcity in our society is often decried.

This suggestion--that some forms of performance important in the community require evaluative development and even independence and autonomy--leads to consideration of achievement orientations.

Speculations on "Achievement-Orientation"

"Achievement" is a culture-bound concept. What is usually meant in discussions of "achievement orientation" is that the individual is led to industriously orient his actions toward attaining those goals generally held to be desirable or otherwise valued in his society. Obviously, the industrious man who is destructive to society could, in one sence, be "achievement oriented". He is not usually afforded that label however, but rather is termed "power mad", "demented", or "fanatic". There is no need to here quibble with popular usage, and we shall confine speculation to the approved meaning of "achievements orientation".*

---

* This means, for one thing, that the discussion is immediately truncated, for only certain types of achievement are actively sought and encouraged in contemporary Western society. In the minds of those concerned with 'talent' and excellence, expressive achievement in which affect is a dominant influence in both selection of pathways and justifications), as in art and music, are inferior in status to insturmental achievements (in which cognitive horizons are dominant in both selection

To be brief, let us suggest that the essential requirements for development of the desire to achieve include:

1. A fairly well developed array of cathexted-object relations of some internal coherence and (if efforts to achieve are to be directed in socially desirable ways) in which the object-relations are positively sanctioned or otherwise rewarded in the community;

2. A fairly well developed conception of self which is distinctly different from the ideal self such that the ideal self is subject to continued falsification (and, of course, the more continuing the falsification--as long as it is not overly harsh--the heavier the cathexis);

3. Fairly well developed conceptions of pathways and channels which might lead to goal attainment;

4. Percieved possession of the vehicles necessary to traverse the required pathways.*

It can be assumed that an effective curriculum assures the minimal cognitive elaboration required for at least the latter three elements (awarness of self, vehicles and pathways). The more crucial questions are: can we make any generalizations about the type of object relations most likely to be cathected within the structure of the classroom? And, as one entree to that question, can we generalize about predominant influences on cathexes?

Once again, the triatic relations of the child must be considered. In early years, in most cases, the family is the most

---

*It should be clear that any of the perceptions and evaluation might, from an objective perspective, be completely invalid. For consideration of the genesis of actions, however, the objective perspective is not important. If a man thinks he can fly, he can fly--at least as far as his choice of action goes. Of course the phenomenal materials are limited in controlling consequences: If the man attempts to soar from the "Top of the Mark", he is liable to a rather harsh falsification, and drastic rearrangement of his horizons is likely.

---

and justification). Without offering comment on the desirablity of this focus, we will confine concern here to the question of maximizing instrumental achievement orientation in the classroom in such a way that the individual still retains it even when an adult.

influential determinant of cathexes: likely, in the family, early foundations are begun which may prove more or less receptive to later efforts to instill the desire for achievement. (Furthermore, one crucial aspect of these foundations is likely the level of independence as discussed above.) But in these early years, "achievement" efforts may be grossly characterized as responses to direct expectations, or as desires to please parents or teachers. That is, they are functions of internalizations or special identifications; abstract identifications do not play much of a part in the child's choice of action. Nor are they especially important in the pre-adolescent's choice: of the limited identifications of which the pre-adolescent is capable, it is likely that many if not most are with peers. In this pre-adolescent stage, we suspect that only a few abstract identifications are formed; the child's activities are selected with reference to (again, extremely groosly) internalizations of family and teacher ("My mother and Miss Jones want me to do it") and special identifications with peers ("I want to be like Joey").

At this level of development, two classroom efforts seem reasonable. The teacher might encourage the child to not only internalize their relationship, but to identify it, and (in cases in which desirable modes of activity are represented at home) to encourage similar identification with parents. (One technique she might use is controlled falsifications of the internalized relationship, forcing specification and probably eliciting identification.) This, of course, implies the child does, indeed, internalize (cathect) their relation; hence this technique may be of little use with many children, and of only rare use by the rather "unlovable" teacher.

The second effort might be more generally usefull; it is, in classroom and curriculum, to ensure that children who represent desired qualities are so treated that probability is maximized of their being identified, and to ensure that children who are already popular objects of identification are maximally encouraged to develop and display the desired qualities. Simple as they appear, these techniques are highly complex. Classroom experience and observation for instance, continually evidence that impossed systems of status and reward often backfire: to gain classroom honor is to risk peer hostility. This "backlash" is even more critical in the adolescent classroom.

In adolesence not only are horizons fairly well differentiated and elaborated but also, it appears, new resources of affect have become available. The adolescent is capable of more intence internalizations and identifications than the child, and he is more likely to cathect generalized and abstract object-relations. (Though even young children are able to perceive generalized relations, they are unlikely to cathect them.) At this stage, and perhaps especially in contemporary Western society, the peer group generally offers the markedly dominate object-relations for cathexis: it is fairly clear that in contemporary society peers are exceptionally important in the adolescent classroom.* What does this mean for our discussion of achievement? An answer can be approached if we distinguish between two types of achievement orientation.

Dominance Achievement: In this type of achievement orientation, success is seen as attainment of wealth, power or esteem over others. The individual oriented only to this type of achievement looks at each task for what it offers him, for what potentials it holds for the gaining of dominance. It has been argued by some comentators that this is a sick type of achievement, but sick or not, the will to dominance is a highly useful component in the development of economy and society.

Accomplishment: In this type of achievement orientation success is seen as the accomplishment of a task, as mastery not of other individuals, but rather of a problem. The child, as most adults, can be lead into a task-oriented success in desires to please teachers or other identified persons, but if the orientation is to be perminent, and enduring (as we suggested earlier is an essential requirement of societial concern with achievement) the orientation must necessarily proceed from, minimally, general identifications and, more desirably, from individual autonomy.

---

*Peer dominance is observable and our theory suggests some reasons. In the first place, peers are the major sources of satisfaction of those needs the child or adolescent is able to specify, but for which he has not yet developed pathways. Not only do peers offer repertoires of pathways channels and vehicles they also often share exigencies and share satisfaction through mutually channeling their articulations and actions. Further, many of their shared exigencies are the result of shared or similar falsifications, often introduced by adults. And, of special importance, because peer relations are without external structure or support, they are continually subject to falsification; indeed, it can be said that the threat to falsification hangs over every personal relation, or lies at its base. To be sure, the relationship may be highly intense even though it has never been falsified, and though both persons are free of fear of falsification--but, we suspect, such a relationship basks in the cathetic glow built from many experienced or imagined falsifications of prior relations. (It was not a sociologist, nor a psychologist, who suggested that every great passion is built from years of loneliness.)

The marked importance of peers in American society also seems reasonable (although, we must constantly caution ourselves, most phenomena do seem reasonable post hoc), for the adolescent is offered few satisfactions (however many pleasantries) and many demands by adult society; more and more of his exigencies must be resolved in the peer group, or not at all; he cannot appeal to tradition (there is little) and the structures of society impose few solutions.

Classroom efforts can, theoretically, lend themselves to the development of either type of achievement orientation, but in reality they are generally structured only to instill the former, compitition-based achievement. Further, because of the extreme importance of peers in the contempory classroom, even this effort faces extreme difficulties. In particular, we suspect that the classroom today is deficient especially in two ways: in its failure to encourage and allow the development of horizons of justification (as argued above) and in its structures of competition.

Though the horizons of justification have been discussed above, one further consideration is appropriate here. Though we are concerned only with development of instrumental (and not expressive) achievement orientations, it is difficult to conceive of a permanent "success drive" toward either dominence or accomplishment that does not involve heavy interlacings of evaluations. What is asked of schools today is that they orient children toward achievement, not only providing metapathways and vehicles, but also building in intense justifications (however limited in scope) for "success". In this task, the school operates as a consistent part of our social system: the measure of man today is his success. The ideal man is so oriented to his society that his actions are chosen rationally and evaluatively, with only secondary referance to affective involvement. (For example, the Western hero does his duty to hunt down and have hanged his best friend who has turned rustler. The compassion he evidences is only the cream on the cake, making his ratio-evaluative decision all the more admirable.) In short, in the ideal man horizons of justification are strongly determined by cognitive horizons: the expression of affect, though recognized as pleasant, is of far less importance.*

---

*Of course, the completely just man, who bases his evaluations purely on cognition--as sometimes the Germans have been depicted in sterotype--is also far from the hero: the important point here is that rationality dominates and affect is allowed to play only a limited part, and only in some types of justification.

This orientation, however, is a world distant from that apparent in many if not most adolescents, who have not yet learned the wisdom (i.e., that kicks can be avoided) of confining affective expression. Heavily charged with semi-disciplined passions, the adolescent would likely approve e. e. cummings censure of ratio-evaluative orientations:

Since feeling is first
who pays any attention
to the syntax of things
will never wholly kiss you.

What is given little attention in the adult world of business and competition is that affect can carry its own justification. For many adolescents, actions are chosen, and the world (or his picture of the world) is, foremost, organized around his affective horizons, strained through an emotion-dominated screen of justifications. It is this organization of horizons and affect which the schools are asked to replace with a ratio-evaluative orientation. The task is difficult, in part because schools do not have all the necessary tools for the task, nor the support of general norms, or of traditional values accepted by most persons as valid. The point is, in our society it is exceedingly difficult for the school or any other agency to lead the child to cathect the ratio-evaluative model of success, for it is harshly, and repeatedly falsified, while alternative (contradictory) types of relation are moderately falsified, for example by films and popular culture (in which adults who share the adolescents' subjective orientations depict rebellion against the societal model) and, even more importantly, by the adolescent's own peer group.

One of the basic tenets of all education is that the individual must be met at his own level, or slightly above it, and led to the "higher" level desired by the teacher. Insofar as evaluative horizons go, classrooms generally fail to do this (and the extreme response of children to the occasional teacher who does attempt to moderately falsify evaluative horizons gives evidence of its importance: such teachers are usually either markedly popular and effective, or markely ineffectual). What is required is attention to the constructive falsification of the child's evaluative horizons, which are heavily dominated by affect, attention which must begin in early years of school, if it is to be effective during the critical period of adolescence.

Among the dominant characteristics of adolescent subcultures (which we have argued are the source of the most important falsifications for the adolescent) are provincialism and chauvinism, which means that areas of horizons of cognition and justification in which the adolescent might be effectively "reached" in the classroom are very narrow, as well as intensely emotional.

In seeking to instill "healthy" achievement orientation, then, perhaps it would help if the adolescent's cognitive horizons included repertories of justifications (that is, not the individual's own justifications, but awareness of alternatives to his own). In early years, the classroom might consciously offer these cognitive falsifications, introducing for instance, comparative materials on Buddhism, atheism, Communism, Zionism and other religious, political and social doctrines, not merely pointing out the brotherhood of man and the similarities of ideas and values but also the differences and the importance of the differences between the various systems. The intent would be to develop a repertoire of pathways to be used later, in the adolescent search for "identity". Given this established repertoire, in the adolescent classroom constructive falsifications of existing justifications could be introduced, encouraging the adolescent to refine his affectively oriented justifications in the context of the cognitive repertoire built in earlier years of schooling. What might be sought would be not the replacement of an affect-dominated justification with a cognition dominated, but construction by the individual of a horizon of justifications based on both affect and rationality.*

What of the structures of the classroom? It is widely recognized that the system of rewards general in American classrooms encourages competition among students, stimulating them to strive for mastery over one another. But, in contemporary society, this structure violates the peer sub-culture, which emphasizes the importance of cooperation among peers, particularly in the adult-imposed classroom situation. Speaking very generally, two types of products might be expected of this clash of expectations between classroom and peers: first, some children will emerge highly dominance oriented, perhaps aggressively and hostilely competitive with their peers for success; second, most children will emerge non-competitive. Beyond a gentlemanly level of attainment, achievable by most of the persons in their immediate peer group, they will make little effort to accomplish either tasks, or to seek dominance. Though they may be motivated enough to attend a university and to graduate, perhaps even at the Masters level, they will be more interested in social harmony and security than in accomplishment or dominance. What we are suggesting is that a third product might be sought in the classroom: task-oriented achievement.

---

*It might be argued that what we are suggesting would be but a prelude to further manipulation of the child by authority. It is true that the innovation we suggest could be used for this purpose, but, as so many other tools and weapons, any educational tools can be turned to either good or ill.

Today, the great need in the classroom is for task-oriented cooperation in which the child recognized a challenge not from other children who are attempting to outdo him, but rather from the task itself. It would be naive to expect the child to develop this orientation by himself (although, apparently, some children do do it with little stimulation from the classroom). What is required is some system of falsifications which leads the child to cathect object relations involving dominance over subject matter; and the most important tools for encouraging this development are not only teacher rewards, nor rewards from parents, but the approbation of the child's peers. Coleman has argued that the school is so structured today that such approbation, as well as parental and teacher rewards are given most avidly to athletic endeavors.

It appears that the contemporary classroom is still oriented toward a frontier-type of competition which is not only overly ratio-evaluative (naively so, for it lacks the power to enforce it) but--perhaps even more important--which is constantly undermined by peers and family, as well as by the adolescent's own affective orientation. The idea of classroom competition pitting individual against individual has often been criticized, and various alternative techniques of teaching and of grading have been attempted. Coleman suggests, in addition, that school representation in "academic sports" be developed to parallel school representations in athletic sports. This plan might be especially effective if the academic sports were made highly visible not only to the adult community, but also to the child in early grades who is looking to older children for clues about what is valuable behavior.

It might also prove valuable to consider modification of curricula to include, if not to be oriented around, team competition in the classroom. One class might be pitted against another for an entire semester or year, or two nearby schools might compete with one another class for class, throughout the academic year. Indeed, even within the individual classroom, teams might be formed for special, moderately long-range projects. Such innovations have been suggested before, and of course, are fraught with difficulties. Once again, however, the difficulties should not discourage consideration of the possibilities.

Conclusion

In these speculations many loose ends have been left untied, and often unidentified. It should again be emphasized that the speculations venture far beyond the arena of careful and systematic thought in which most adademic discussion is accomplished. Torturous though the discussion has been, it has wended its way around a simple set of concerns: first, that falsifications in the classroom are introduced not only in the teacher-student relationship, but in a blending of the triatic relationships of child with parents, with peers, and with teachers. Second, that in its neglect of horizons of evaluation, schools maybe failing to aid the child and adolescent in a development toward autonomy. Third, that the schools are operating with a defunct conception of achievement, which is constantly undermined by peer and family relations, and by the child's and adolescent's own affective orientations. Beyond more sensitive efforts to encourage identification with cognitive-evaluative materials, it was suggested that classroom efforts to instill dominance achievement and cognitive independence be joined by efforts to instill task-oriented achievement and autonomy, both of which require continuing, constructive falsification of evaluative horizons.

APPENDIX C: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MATERIALS RELATING SITUATION AND MOTIVATION.*

Abraham, W. "Motivating the Gifted Underachiever," *Education*, v. 82, 1962, pp. 468-71.

Underachievers need: 1) outside inspiration and support, 2) a definite recognition of their position, 3) an "earthy" approach (money or grades), 4) freedom to be themselves, 5) not to be always pushed toward goals at the top, 6) at times a little deprivation, 7) most importantly to be identified early. The general conclusion is that an individualized approach is needed.

Atkinson, J. W. *Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society: A Method of Assessment and Study*. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1958.

Presentation of a method for assessment of human motives through analysis of the content of thematic apperceptive stories and other kinds of samples of imaginative thought. The social motives of achievement, affiliation, and power are given special emphasis.

______ and W. R. Reitman. "Performance as A Function of Motive Strength and Expectancy of Goal-Attainment," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, v. 53, 1956, pp. 361-66.

When motives (for affiliation and money) other than achievement are also aroused, there is no relationship between achievement motive and performance (or, the achievement motive is somewhere "buried" in the data).

______. "Towards Experimental Analysis of Human Motivation in Terms of Motives, Expectancies, and Incentives," in Atkinson, *op. cit.*

In an experiment, S's tried hardest to complete simple tasks (which had rewards attached for a certain proportion of the S's) when they were most uncertain about the outcome. S's also tried harder when the incentive was greater.

Bene, E. "Some Differences Between Middle Class and Working Class Grammar School Boys in Their Attitudes Towards Education," *British Journal of Sociology*, v. 10, 1959, pp. 148-52.

The only statistically significant difference found was that MC boys more often than LC boys liked books and classical music.

Chandler, B. J., L. J. Stiles, and J. I. Kitsuse. *Education in Urban Society*. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1962.

Part Two, "The Social Matrix of Education in Urban Areas," is of interest. It contains an analysis of the implications for urban education that are found in the nature and characteristics of metropolitan social, economic, and political life.

---

*By Michael Malec

Cloward, R. A. and J. A. Jones. "Social Class: Educational Attitudes and Participation," in Passow, A. H. Education in Depressed Areas. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1963, pp. 190-216.

Findings include: 1) that evaluations of the importance of education in the lower and working classes appear to be influenced by occupational aspirations; 2) that participation in educational activities influences evaluations of the importance of education and attitudes toward the school as an institution.

Coleman, J. S. The Adolescent Society. New York: The Free Press, 1961.

A study of the adolescent subcultures in ten U. S. high schools. It is shown that the paths chosen by high school students depend greatly on the value climates of the school.

______. "Academic Achievement and the Structure of Competition," Harvard Educational Review, v. 29, 1959, pp. 330-51.

A paradox is presented: learning is important, but adolescent subcultures place little emphasis on it. This can be accounted for if the school is viewed as an institution making demands which the group norms tend to resist. A fruitful alternative to interpersonal competition for grades would be interscholastic and intramural scholastic competition. It is crucial to use the informal group rewards to reinforce the aims of education rather than to impede them.

______. "The Adolescent Subculture and Academic Achievement," American Journal of Sociology, v. 65, 1960, pp. 337-47.

In an adolescent social system in which academic achievement is highly valued, those who achieve highly will include more people whose actual intelligence is high than in a social system where this activity is less valued. In schools where academic achievement is not valued, the "intellectuals" of that school will not be the most capable, but merely those who are willing to work hard at a relatively unrewarded activity.

Davie, J. S. "Some Observations on Superior Students," Journal of Educational Sociology, v. 35, 1961, pp. 172-77.

Superior students (those whose grade averages are above the median) in Ivy League colleges presented a picture of an upwardly mobile, intellectually oriented group whose chief motivations and achievements were in the academic area.

DiVesta, F. J. "Meaningful Learning: Motivational, Personality, Interpersonal, and Social Variables," Review of Educational Research, v. 31, 1961, pp. 511-21.

Motivation may be controlled by external factors (such as the teacher) or internal factors (such as ego involvement or level of aspiration).

Dole, A. A. "Reported Determinants of Educational Choice," Personnel and Guidance Journal, v. 42, 1964, pp. 564-71.

20,000 S's from sixth graders to adults, were questioned for reasons for electing proximate or broad educational programs. The four most constant items across educational levels by sex were value of satisfaction, interest in ideas, influence of experience, and influence of friends.

Douvan, E. "Social Status and Success Strivings," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, v. 52, 1956, pp. 219-23.

Middle class and working class S's were tested under two reward conditions, symbolic and material. Both classes responded similarly to the material reward, but achievement strivings of WC S's dropped significantly when the material reward was absent, while motivation of MC S's remained high. It was concluded that the pattern of achievement motivation a child develops depends on the class subculture in which he is trained.

Farquhar, W. W. and D. A. Payne. "Factors in the Academic-Occupational Motivations of Eleventh Grade Under- and Over-Achievers," Personnel and Guidance Journal, v. 42, 1963, pp. 245-51.

The general assumption tested was that the motivational elements which function in the academic situation function similarly in occupational aspiration. Two sex-common occupational factors were found: unique accomplishment vs. avoidance of education and long- vs. short-term job involvement. Also found were one male factor, high vs. low job involvement, and one female factor, high vs. low job interest.

Floud, J. and A. H. Halsey. "Education and Social Structure: Theories and Methods," Harvard Educational Review, v. 29, 1959, pp. 288-96.

The major weakness of the sociology of education is that "too few professional sociologists have paid it detailed and systematic attention."

Frymier, J. R. "A Study of Students' Motivation to Do Good Work in School," Journal of Educational Research, v. 57, 1964, pp. 239-44.

A sentence completion test was administered to 1050 5th, 8th, and 11th graders. Results: 1) No clear reason emerged ("...motivational patterns are diverse and complex"); 2) "...there appears to be a definite shift in the sense of responsibility for doing good work in school from the student to the teacher over a period of time." That is, as students become older, they place greater dependence on the teacher.

Gehman, W. S. "Application of Motivational Theory to the Teaching Process," Educational Forum, v. 28, 1964, pp. 347-54.

The author presents Murray's need theory as it might be used in an educational setting, showing how the various needs might be satisfied through learning.

Golann, S. E. "Creativity Motive," *Journal of Personality*, v. 30, 1962, pp. 588-600.
The author indicates a relation between "self-actualization" (Rogers, et al.) and creativity. Creativity as a motive does not fit well into drive-reduction theories.

Grann, L. R. *et al.* "The Relationship between Academic Achievement of Pupils and the Social Structure of the Classroom," *Rural Sociology*, v. 21, 1956, pp. 179-80.
IQ appears to be the foundation of the difference between the accepted and the rejected child as manifested in the form of school achievement. Achievement seems to be a basic factor preceding acceptability.

Grimes, J. W. and W. Allinsmith. "Compulsivity, Anxiety, and School Achievement," *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, v. 7, 1961, pp. 247-73.
The hypothesis tested was: there is an interaction between classroom teaching method and pupils' personality characteristics in determining school achievement. Results: under structured teaching, compulsives do substantially better than less compulsives; but compulsivity makes no difference in unstructured settings. Anxiety impedes performance under unstructured settings, but not in structured settings. Children Hi anxious and Hi compulsive overachieve in a structured environment. Children Hi anxious and Lo compulsive underachieve in an unstructured environment.

Hawk, T. L. and L. M. DeRidder. "A Comparison of the Performance of Pre-Graded Students with Grade-Motivated Students," *Journal of Educational Research*, v. 56, 1963, pp. 548-50.
An experimental group was told that their college course grade would depend on their previous grade point average, and "...in the absence of motivation for a grade, the majority of students did not exert their usual degree of effort."

Herriott, R. E. "Some Social Determinants of Educational Aspiration," *Harvard Educational Review*, v. 33, 1963, pp. 157-77.
It was found that the level of self-assessment relative to others, and level of expectations that significant others are perceived as holding for one's behavior, are significantly related to aspiration.

Hills, J. R. "Needs for Achievement, Aspirations, and College Criteria," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, v. 49, 1958, pp. 156-61.
A follow-up of McClelland's work which attempts to modify his n-Ach test. No significant results were obtained.

Jones, A. *et al.* "Information Deprivation as A Motivational Variable," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, v. 62, 1961, pp. 126-37.

Among a sample of college students, information deprivation (a boredom situation in a light-proof, sound-proof room) functions as a drive variable in the same sense as the homeostatic drives of hunger, pain, and thirst.

Kahl, J. A. "Educational and Occupational Aspirations of 'Common Man' Boys," *Harvard Educational Review*, v. 23, 1953, pp. 186-203.

An interview study aimed at exploring the social influences which help to account for differences in motivation among high school boys of similar working class, or "common man," backgrounds and of similar intelligence level. Parental pressure was found to be highly associated with these differences. Discontented parents tended to train their sons from the earliest years of grammar school to take school seriously and use education as the means to climb into the middle class.

Kausler, D. H. "Aspiration Level as a Determinant of Performance," *Journal of Personality*, v. 27, 1959, pp. 346-51.

Expressing an aspiration level serves to increase performance level on subsequent tasks. "The results suggested the operation of a set which is evoked by expressing an aspiration level. This set, in turn, is modified by the frame of reference encompassing the expression of the aspiration level."

Kerckhoff, A. C. "Anomie and Achievement Motivation: A Study of Personality Development within Cultural Disorganization," *Social Forces*, v. 37, 1959, pp. 196-202.

A study of white and Chippewa Indian children. For both, older children have higher n-Ach scores than younger children. Whites have higher scores than Indians. Those Indians who are operationally defined as anomic (i.e., are ambivalent or confused in their orientations toward white and Indian communities) have the lowest n-Ach scores.

King, C. E. "The Applicability of Small Group Knowledge to the Classroom Situation," *Sociology and Social Research*, v. 45, 1960, pp. 18-23.

It is suggested that groups in classroom settings will be highly cohesive and perform well in goal achievement when members are made to realize that 1) an existing personal need can be filled within the group; 2) personal gain may be attained through belonging to the group; 3) there exist possibilities of prestige gains through the group; 4) mutual assistance can be expected; 5) all members share a common fate. It is also suggested that groups should be internally cooperative rather than competitive.

London, P. and M. Fuhrer. "Hypnosis, Motivation, and Performance," Journal of Personality, v. 29, 1961, pp. 321-33.

Hypnosis adds nothing to performance. Motivational instructions are more important than the hypnotic trance. "Motivation" was operationalized as an exhortative remark to the S. The task was one of physical endurance.

Macobey, E. F. "Class Differences in Boys' Choice of Authority Roles," Sociometry, v. 25, 1962, pp. 117-19.

Sixth grade boys from higher socio-economic classes more often chose occupations involving the exercise of authority over others than did lower class boys.

Manninno, F. V. "Family Factors Related to School Persistence," Journal of Educational Sociology, v. 35, 1962, pp. 193-202.

A study of some differences between families of drop-outs and those who remain in school. Two significant results emerged: 1) a larger proportion of mothers of in-school S's than of withdrawals showed interest in and encouraged their children's schooling; 2) mothers of in-school S's also more often stated that they were acquainted with families who had children going to college.

March, L. S. "Motivation: The Key to Good Teaching," Clearing House, v. 34, 1959, pp. 67-70.

Different students need different types of motivation. Some of the more useful motivating forces are 1) curiosity, 2) self-improvement, 3) profit, 4) competition, 5) idol worship, and 6) fear of a low mark.

McClelland, D. C. The Achieving Society. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961.

An application of the need for achievement theories to economic analysis.

______. "The Importance of Early Learning in the Formation of Motives," in Atkinson, op. cit., pp. 437-52.

Certain conditions, a) those influencing primarily the strength of affective associations (primacy, involvement of the autonomic nervous system, time discrimination and intensity, and effects of frequency of reward) and b) those affecting primarily the generality of affective associations (lack of symbol control, generalized threats and promises, irregularity of original learning conditions, and unreproducibility of the conditions of learning), are more apt to occur in childhood, particularly at the preverbal level. Consequently, affective associations formed in early childhood are apt to be strong and very resistant to unlearning or forgetting.

______, J. W. Atkinson, R. A. Clark, and E. L. Lowell. *The Achievement Motive*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953.
A summary of research on the achievement motive. Basic research method used was a content analysis of experimentally induced fantasy. Also, an attempt is made to outline some proposals for a new theory of motivation.

McDill, E. and J. Coleman. "High School Social Status, College Plans, and Interest in Academic Achievement: A Panel Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, v. 28, 1963, pp. 905-18.
From freshman to senior year in high school there is a shift to a positive orientation toward attending college and a negative orientation toward academic achievement. Status gains result from the adoption of each attitude.

McKeachie, W. J. "Motivation, Teaching Methods, and College Learning," in M. B. Jones (ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1961*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961, pp. 111-42.
General support of McClelland is given in an experiment relating n-Achievement, n-Affiliation, and n-Power to classroom situations which elicit various cues. A crucial assumption is that all students are "motivated" to seek high grades.

Miller, G. A., E. Galanter, and K. H. Pribram. *Plans and the Structure of Behavior*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1960.
A discussion of the concept of Plan--"any hierarchical process in the organism that can control the order in which a sequence of operations is to be performed."

Moore, J. W. and W. I. Smith. "Motivation in Automated Instruction," *School Life*, v. 46, 1963, pp. 21-22.
Two studies suggest that the method of programmed instruction for pupils with "high hope of success" should take the form of difficult problem solving; for pupils of comparable ability with "fear of failure" some type of "spoonfeeding" should be used. Achievement and interest in programmed instruction are related to type of motivation as well as to ability.

Musgrove, F. "Role-Conflict in Adolescence," *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, v. 34, 1964, pp. 34-42.
Conflict was determined by disparities among ideal, real, and adult expectations of behavior. Boys experience more role-conflict than girls. Students in grammar schools showed more conflict than students in modern schools.

Ohles, J. F. "Motivation as a Situational Process," *Educational Theory*, v. 12, 1962, pp. 102-05.
A basic problem to be faced is that theoretical discussions of motivation are highly complex and abstract, while classroom applications are proposed in most simple terms. The identifica-

tion of all human needs is probably an impossible task. Each person is unique and in a unique situation. Motivation reacts more to the situation than to the isolated stimulus.

Parsons, T. "The School as a Social System: Some of Its Functions in American Society," *Harvard Educational Review*, v. 29, 1959, pp. 297-318.
The primary selective process for college occurs through differentiated school performance in elementary school. The main axis of differentiation is achievement.

Passow, A. H. *Education in Depressed Areas*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1963.
Part III, "Sociological Aspects of Education in Depressed Areas," is of interest.

Prentice, W. C. H. "Some Cognitive Aspects of Motivation," *American Psychologist*, v. 16, 1961, pp. 503-11.
The author suggests that it might be possible that "...what we call motives are really a particular kind of perceptual or cognitive event."

Rosen, B. C. and R. D'Andrade. "The Psychosocial Origins of Achievement Motivation," *Sociometry*, v. 22, 1959, pp. 185-218.
Achievement motivation is the result of 1) achievement training, 2) independence training, and 3) sanctions. The first is more important than the second, but neither are effective without sanctions. Research also indicates that middle class parents are likely to develop a higher mean level of achievement motivation in their sons than lower class parents. Parents of boys with high n-Ach as contrasted with parents of boys with low n-Ach "tend to be more competitive, show more involvement, and seem to take more pleasure in the problem-solving experiments." They are more interested in their sons' performance, encourage him more, give him more affection, and have higher aspirations for him.

Sanford, N. *The American College: A Psychological and Social Interpretation of the Higher Learning*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962.
Chapter 4, "Motivational Factors in College Entrance," Part IV (Chs. 13-15), "Student Society and Student Culture," and Chapter 21, "Environments for Learning," are of interest.

Schmuck, R. A. and R. W. Schmuck. "Upward Mobility and IQ Performance," *Journal of Educational Research*, v. 55, 1961, pp. 123-27.
Higher IQ scores came from children of "distinctly" upwardly mobile families; from families where the male parent had a "head" rather than a "hands" job; from families where fathers had twelve or more years of formal schooling.

Sermul, M. J. "The Effects of Coeducation on Attitudes of Male College Students," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, v. 35, 1961, pp. 11-17.
A study of males before and after coeducation was introduced at a New York City college. After, males studied more, participated more in class, and were more satisfied with choice of college. Males also perceived that class discussions became less stimulating and that professors gave higher grades to girls.

Shouksmith, G. and J. W. Taylor. "The Effect of Counselling on the Achievement of High-Ability Pupils," *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, v. 34, 1964, pp. 51-57.
S's were under-achievers with high ability. The Counselling group was given tests and non-directive counselling. A placebo group was given the tests only. The control group received neither. Test results showed a significant difference in the achievement scores of the Counselling group in 4 of 6 tests, while in the remaining two tests, results approached significance.

Stagner, R. "Homeostasis Need Reduction, and Motivation," *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, v. 7, 1961, pp. 49-68.
A theoretical statement suggesting that homeostasis is not a force, but rather a state.

Stern, G. G. "Characteristics of the Intellectual Climate in College Environments," *Harvard Educational Review*, v. 33, 1963, pp. 5-41.
A listing and description of many characteristics which distinguish between colleges with high and low intellectual climates is presented. The study is based on a survey of 2000 students from 32 colleges, as well as from other sources of data. The conclusion is that the intellectual climate of an institution is closely related to the quality of its student body and to their later academic achievement.

Vinacke, W. E. "Drive-Modification Theory of Human Motivation," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, v. 96, 1960, pp. 245-68.
A lengthy theoretical statement of drive modification theory.

Vincent, N. M. P. and H. L. Merrill. "Effective Classroom Motivation," *Peabody Journal of Education*, v. 38, 1960, pp. 10-13.
It is suggested that the major classroom motives are 1) intent to learn, 2) reward and punishment, 3) knowledge of results, 4) stress, and 5) life goals.

Wallen, C. J. "Teacher, Individual, and Group Issued Incentives and Pupil Performance," *Journal of Educational Research*, v. 57, 1964, pp. 413-16.
No significant results were reported. It was concluded that "The motivational power of an incentive is not related to the source of that incentive."